

KEYWORD: Guideline F

DIGEST: Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to establish mitigation. Adverse decision affirmed.

CASENO: 08-07463.a1

DATE: 04/17/2009

DATE: April 17, 2009

In Re:	)	
	)	
-----	)	ISCR Case No. 08-07463
	)	
Applicant for Security Clearance	)	

**APPEAL BOARD DECISION**

**APPEARANCES**

**FOR GOVERNMENT**

James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel

**FOR APPLICANT**

*Pro Se*

The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On August 28, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). Applicant requested a hearing. On February 2, 2009, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Darlene Lokey Anderson denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance. Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.

Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.

Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse decision is unfair because it focuses on only one part of his life. Applicant has not demonstrated that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.

Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to establish mitigation. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision. As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or *vice versa*. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007). A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).

In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant conditions and factors. The Judge reasonably explained why the mitigating evidence was insufficient to overcome the government’s security concerns. The Board does not review a case *de novo*.

After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting *Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States*, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). Therefore, the Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.

**Order**

The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.

Signed: Michael Y. Ra'anan

Michael Y. Ra'anan  
Administrative Judge  
Chairman, Appeal Board

Signed: Jean E. Smallin

Jean E. Smallin  
Administrative Judge  
Member, Appeal Board

Signed: William S. Fields

William S. Fields  
Administrative Judge  
Member, Appeal Board