DATE: July 18, 2006

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SSN:-----------

Applicant for Security Clearance

PPEAL BOARD DECISION

APPEARANCES

FOR GOVERNMENT

Peregrine D. Russell-Hunter, Esq., , Chief Department Counsel

FOR APPLICANT

Pro Se

The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On March 18, 2005, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that decision--security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended)(Directive). Applicant requested a hearing. On January 23, 2006, after the hearing, Administrative Judge James A. Young denied Applicant's request for a security clearance. Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.

Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Administrative Judge's adverse clearance decision under Guidelines B and F is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

Applicant argues that the Administrative Judge's adverse clearance decision should be reversed because the Judge made several errors with respect to his findings. Applicant also argues that the Judge did not give sufficient weight to Applicant's mitigating evidence. The Board does not find Applicant's arguments persuasive.

The findings which Applicant challenges are either permissible characterizations by the Administrative Judge or harmless error, in that they would not be reasonably likely to change the outcome of the case. Applicant has not met his burden of demonstrating that the Administrative Judge's material findings with respect Applicant's conduct of security concern do not reflect a reasonable or plausible interpretation of the record evidence. The Board does not review a case de novo. Considering the record evidence as a whole, the Judge's material findings of security concern are sustainable.

The application of disqualifying and mitigating conditions does not turn simply on a finding that one or more of them applies to the particular facts of a case. Rather, their application requires the exercise of sound discretion in light of the record evidence as a whole. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 01-14740 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan.15, 2003). Thus, the presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision. As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa. An applicant's disagreement with the Judge's weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

In this case, the Administrative Judge reasonably weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and circumstances, and considered the possible application of relevant mitigating conditions. The Judge found in favor of the Applicant with respect to some of the SOR allegations. However, the Judge articulated a rational basis for not favorably applying any mitigating conditions to the remainder of the allegations, and reasonably explained why the evidence which the Applicant had presented in mitigation was insufficient to overcome the government's security concerns. Given the record that was before him, the Judge's ultimate unfavorable clearance decision under Guidelines B and F is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

The decision of the Administrative Judge denying Applicant a clearance is AFFIRMED.

Signed: Jean E. Smallin

Jean E. Smallin

Administrative Judge

Member, Appeal Board

Signed: William S. Fields

William S. Fields

Administrative Judge

Member, Appeal Board

Signed: Mark W. Harvey

Mark W. Harvey

Administrative Judge

Member, Appeal Board