



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**



In the matter of:)	
)	
-----)	ISCR Case No. 21-02288
)	
Applicant for Security Clearance)	

Appearances

For Government: Adrienne M. Driskill, Esquire, Department Counsel

For Applicant: *Pro se*

May 19, 2022

Decision

ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge:

Statement of the Case

Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) on November 30, 2020. (Item 2.) On November 5, 2021, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse). (Item 1.) The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the *National Security Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position*, effective within the Department of Defense on June 8, 2017.

Applicant answered the SOR in writing (Answer) on November 23, 2021, and requested his case be decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. (Item 1.) In his Answer Applicant admitted both allegations in the SOR. On January 18, 2022, Department Counsel submitted the Department's written case. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM), consisting of Items 1 to 3, was provided to Applicant, who received the file on January 28, 2022.

Applicant was given 30 days from receipt of the FORM to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. Applicant elected not to submit any additional information.

Department Counsel submitted three Items in support of the SOR allegations. Item 3 is inadmissible. It will not be considered or cited as evidence against Applicant's interests in this case. It is the summary of an unsworn interview of Applicant conducted by an interviewer from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on March 8, 2021. Applicant did not adopt it as his own statement, or otherwise certify it to be accurate. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.20, this Report of Investigation summary is inadmissible against Applicant's interests in the absence of an authenticating witness. See Executive Order 10865 § 5. In light of Applicant's admissions, Item 3 is also cumulative. I therefor reviewed it for any potentially mitigating information that Applicant might have thought would be considered. No mitigating information was found in Item 3 that was not available from other sources in the record, and which was accordingly considered.

The case was assigned to me on April 6, 2022. Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Findings of Fact

Applicant is a 34-year-old employee of a defense contractor, where he works as a senior customer operations engineer. He has a Bachelor's degree. Applicant is not married and has no children. He is seeking to obtain national security eligibility for a security clearance in connection with his employment in the Defense industry. (Government Exhibit 1 at Sections 12, 13A, and 17.)

Paragraph 1 (Guideline H – Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse)

The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for clearance due to his use of illegal drugs. Applicant admitted allegations 1.a and 1.b under this paragraph.

1.a. Applicant has used marijuana on a frequent basis since approximately October 2005. Applicant used marijuana up to the time he was interviewed by an

investigator in March 2021. (Item 3.) There is no information in the record, including Item 3, to show that Applicant has stopped all marijuana use.

Applicant stated in Section 23 of the e-QIP in answer to a question about the nature, frequency and number of times he used marijuana (Item 2):

Usage has been for the purposes of mitigating health issue impacting quality of life such as insomnia, loss of appetite, anxiety, as well as for use recreationally. Use has also assisted with side effects of medication (vyvanse) used for treating ADHD.

A different part of Section 23 asked Applicant to explain why he intended, or did not intend, to use marijuana in the future:

My plan is to use the remaining portion of the year [2020] to substitute the benefits for holistic options such as tea, yoga, meditation, proper eating habits, and exercise. The goal is to ensure quality of life, mental health, and maintain appetite while reducing stress. I select 'Yes' because I intend to submit this form before the end of November 2020.

Finally, Applicant was asked in a different part of Section 23 if he intended to engage in marijuana use in the future. Applicant stated, "No." As stated, Applicant continued to use marijuana until March 2021, if not later.

1.b. Applicant admitted on his e-QIP that he purchased marijuana for consumption about every 3 to 4 months. He stated that he engaged in this activity because, "Use of substance provides a higher quality of life and address the widest range of stressors." (Item 2 at Section 23.)

Policies

When evaluating an applicant's national security eligibility for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant's national security eligibility.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge's overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider

all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture.

Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See *also* Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.)

Analysis

Paragraph 1 (Guideline H – Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse)

The security concern relating to Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse is set forth in AG ¶ 24:

The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules,

and regulations. *Controlled substance* means any “controlled substance” as defined in 21 U.S.C. §802. *Substance misuse* is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above.

I have examined the disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 25 and especially considered the following:

- (a) any substance misuse (see above definition);
- (c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution, or possession of drug paraphernalia; and
- (g) expressed intent to continue drug involvement and substance misuse, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue such misuse.

Applicant has a history of using illegal drugs. He has used marijuana on a regular basis since 2005 through at least March 2021, after stating in his November 2020 e-QIP that he intended to stop. Applicant stated that he intended to continue to use marijuana since its use had helped him manage stress and anxiety. He had also purchased marijuana many times over the years. All three of the disqualifying conditions apply, thereby transferring the burden to Applicant to mitigate them.

The following mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 26 have also been considered:

- (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and
- (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug-involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to:
 - (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
 - (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and
 - (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility.

Applicant admitted his long-term use of marijuana, his repeated purchases of marijuana, and his intent to continue its use until some unknown time in the future. None

of the mitigating conditions apply to Applicant's use. Applicant has not met his burden of persuasion to mitigate the security concerns arising from his lengthy history of drug involvement at this time. This allegation is found against Applicant.

Whole-Person Concept

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

- (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
- (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
- (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct;
- (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
- (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary;
- (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes;
- (7) the motivation for the conduct;
- (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
- (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns resulting from his long-term drug involvement. Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant's present suitability for national security eligibility and a security clearance.

Formal Findings

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline H:

AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b:

Against Applicant

Conclusion

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant's national security eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

WILFORD H. ROSS
Administrative Judge