



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**



In the matter of:)
)
) ISCR Case No. 21-00116
)
Applicant for Security Clearance)

Appearances

For Government: Sakeena Farhath, Esq., Department Counsel
Allison Marie, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: *Pro se*

02/02/2023

Decision

MURPHY, Braden M., Administrative Judge:

In August 2019, Applicant falsified time records and resigned his job during the resulting investigation after his actions came to light. In February 2020, he was terminated from his employment in a later job following allegations of similar conduct. He falsified information on two subsequent security clearance applications by misrepresenting the nature of his departures from those employments. He did not provide sufficient evidence to mitigate the resulting personal conduct security concerns. Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Statement of the Case

Applicant submitted security clearance applications (SCA) in September 2019 and June 2020. On July 15, 2021, following a background investigation, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR), alleging security concerns under Guideline E, personal conduct. The CAF issued the SOR under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as

amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the *National Security Adjudicative Guidelines* (AG), which became effective on June 8, 2017.

Applicant answered the SOR on July 26, 2021, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). The case was assigned to me on May 4, 2022. On September 1, 2022, DOHA issued a notice scheduling the hearing for September 20, 2022, by video-teleconference through an online platform.

Applicant's hearing convened as scheduled. Department Counsel submitted Government's Exhibits (GE) 1 through 4. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through F, all previously submitted with his answer. All exhibits were admitted without objection. The record initially closed at the end of the hearing. The next day, Applicant requested additional time to submit letters of reference, so I reopened the record to allow him the opportunity to do so. Applicant later submitted eight reference letters, which are marked as AE G through N and admitted without objection. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on September 29, 2022. The record closed on October 6, 2022.

Findings of Fact

In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant "admitted" SOR ¶ 1.a, but he provided an explanation that I construe as a denial. He denied SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 1.c, and he admitted SOR ¶ 1.d, all with explanations. I incorporate his admission to SOR ¶ 1.d into the findings of fact. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings and the record evidence submitted, I make the following additional findings of fact.

Applicant is 28 years old. He has never married and has no children. He earned a bachelor's degree in computer information science in 2016. He has held multiple jobs in the information technology (IT) field since 2017, both in cleared and uncleared positions. At times, including currently, he has held both full-time jobs during the week, and second jobs, either at night, or on the weekends.

Applicant began working in IT with healthcare Company M in 2017, first as a contractor, and then, as of March 2018, as a Company M employee. (Tr. 31-32, 50, 55-57; GE 1) He initially worked on weekends during the day. Then he was asked to work 12 am to 8 am (Monday nights and Tuesday nights). (Tr. 55-57) His departure from Company M in August 2019 is the subject of SOR ¶ 1.a, discussed below.

From August 2018 to about December 2019, Applicant also had a full-time job (Monday to Friday, 9 to 5) with federal Contractor I. (Tr. 57-58; GE 2) After his clearance was granted in 2019, and after leaving Company M, Applicant was also a self-employed "1099" contractor with Company T from December 2019 to February

2020 as a systems administrator. His departure from Company T is the subject of SOR ¶ 1.b, discussed below. (Tr. 48-50, 57-58)

Since March 2020, Applicant has worked a full-time, weekday job for Contractor J, a defense contractor who is his current employer and clearance sponsor. During much of this time, he has continued working nights as well, first with Company MS, from January 2020 to July 2020; then with another government agency (AGA), from August 2020 to August 2021, when the contract ended. He briefly had a second job at a health club. Since March 2022, he has also worked a 40-hour night shift job outside the defense industry, with Company IM. He therefore currently works two full-time 40-hour-a-week jobs. (Tr. 48-54, 111-112, 116; GE 2)

SOR ¶ 1.a alleges first, that Applicant falsified time records while he was working at Company M, “representing that you worked hours that you did not work.” SOR ¶ 1.a also alleges that Applicant “resigned upon being advised that you were under investigation for falsification of time records.”

Applicant admitted that, “at [Company M], I did falsify time records” by “clocking in hours where I wasn’t, while I was not at the job,” by taking advantage of the remote clock-in system. (Tr. 32-34) He acknowledged that as an IT help desk professional, he had a responsibility to be available to help those who sought assistance. He had been able to leave early to go to his day job with Federal contractor I because he had a co-worker who would cover for him, which he said was common practice in IT. An investigation ensued when his practice was discovered, after the coworker who covered for him was transferred to another location. (Tr. 34-37; GE 4)

Records from Company M showed several occasions during July and August 2019 when Applicant: a) clocked in remotely at his start time, but actually showed up 15-30 minutes later; and b) left his job before 6 am, but clocked out about three hours later, at about 8:30 am, at the end of his shift. (GE 3 at 9; GE 4, Tr. 39, 60-64)

Applicant also acknowledged that on multiple occasions during this time, he falsified time records for an entire eight-hour shift, to make it appear that he had worked 40 hours a week, when he had only worked 32 hours. He did this for a period of about two to three months in 2019 (Tr. 41-42, 58-59, 67-69, 110-111; GE 4) He acknowledged that he was essentially stealing from his employer by doing so. He was an hourly employee, and he said he did it to make more money. (Tr. 77, 110-111)

Applicant was confronted about his conduct in a phone call with his Company M supervisors on Thursday, August 1, 2019. He said he was told that an investigation was pending and was told to turn in his equipment and to go home, which he did. He considered that he was essentially suspended because he could not work without his equipment. (Tr. 89-90)

The next evening, Applicant received a text from a co-worker, who had heard that Applicant had been terminated. (AE D, AE E, AE F) Applicant submitted his

resignation the next day, on Saturday, August 3, 2019, apparently by e-mail but also by fax. (GE 4) He had not heard confirmation from his manager “about being let go” before he did so. (Tr. 33-34, 70-72, 88-89; Answer)

Applicant acknowledged being told in the August 1 meeting that he was suspended. (Tr. 72-73) He also acknowledged being concerned about his job status after his friend texted him: “That’s when I took the, I guess, I just went forward [with] just resigning because I didn’t know and I was worried, you know, at that point. It was like, race is on.” (Tr. 74, 75)

Applicant also asserted that had he not been told by his friend that he had been terminated, that he had “every intention of going through with the investigation” and returning to work the following Monday. He acknowledged that he resigned before confirming whether or not he would be fired. (Tr. 76, 88-89, 91, 93)

Applicant’s faxed resignation was received at Company M the following Monday, August 5, 2019. In the letter, he gives no reason for his departure, which was “effective immediately.” His resignation was confirmed and accepted by his employer, and considered effective as of Saturday, August 3, 2019. (GE 4) GE 4 includes a company “Record of Conference” about the August 1 phone call, prepared on August 5. There is a notation that Applicant “resigned,” but he did not sign it. Under “Action Taken by Supervisor, the box marked “Termination” is checked. The document also says Applicant “elected to resign in lieu of termination.” (GE 4) Applicant said he was not aware of GE 4 until two years later. (Tr. 69-71)

SOR ¶ 1.b alleges that Applicant was terminated from his employment contract with Contractor T for falsification of time records in February 2020. Applicant admitted he was terminated but denied falsifying time records. Essentially, he questioned why he would be so foolish as to do so soon after being terminated by Company M for doing the same thing. He said it would have been “stupid to steal time and defraud the Government of all places, to do that with my prior history.” (Tr. 42-44; GE 3 at 2)

From December 2019 to February 2020, Applicant was a self-employed “1099” contractor with Company T working as a systems administrator. He said that he had to enter and exit the government facility with a common access card (CAC), and he had to prepare a timesheet for his work. He had to log in and out on-site, via e-mail. (Tr. 86, 118-121; GE 3 at 11-12) He said he left the job in part because he had been hired by another employer, but also because he was terminated. He acknowledged he had been terminated following an allegation of falsifying his time, but he denied any timecard falsification. (Tr. 87, 95, 99-100, 104, 118, 121)

AE B is a text exchange between Applicant and Ms. L, his supervisor at Contractor T, between February 27 and March 17, 2020, after he had left. It concerned the company’s need for him to provide time cards documenting the hours he had worked, as well as Applicant’s concern about being paid. One text from Ms. L says, in

part, “we are waiting for the government and [a related customer, P] to tell us how many hours must be repaid. I will let you know as soon as I know. (AE B)

On March 27, 2020, Ms. L emailed Applicant and said,

“We are still waiting to hear from [customer P]. In the interim, we are willing to pay you for the remaining 96 hours that you entered on [the time card] as long as you reimburse us for any cost or refunds we may have to pay to [customer P] if they request a refund due to the discrepancy between your [] timecard and the Government’s “badge-in log.” If you agree, please respond, “Agreed” to this e-mail and we will do a direct deposit into the account we have on file on March 31, 2020. If not, we will have to wait for [customer P] to respond before we pay you. Thanks.

Applicant responded minutes later: “Agreed.”

Ms. L then responded that “We will make a deposit on March 31, 2020.” (AE C)

Applicant then asserted to Ms. L that he should be paid based on a higher pay rate, effective January 2020 (\$3,672 total instead of \$3,096). (AE C) He testified that Company T paid him the full amount he requested. (Tr. 44-45, 100-103) Department Counsel acknowledged that there was no record evidence of a timecard discrepancy beyond what was referenced in Applicant’s documents. (Tr. 104)

In reporting the circumstances of his August 2019 departure from Company M on his September 2019 SCA, Applicant wrote the following:

I resigned due to wanting to free up time for my family. I was working 7 days a week with this job from Saturday to Monday. I now currently work 5 days a week. (GE 1 at 15; Tr. 79)

Applicant answered “No” to the next question on his SCA, asking, as to this employment, if he had been fired, quit after being told he would be fired, or left by mutual agreement following charges or allegations of misconduct, or notice of unsatisfactory performance. (GE 1 at 15)

SOR ¶ 1.c alleges that Applicant’s stated reason for leaving Company M and his negative answer to the next question on GE 1 were deliberately false. He asserted in his Answer and in his testimony that he had not lied because he had not been fired nor did he resign having been told he would be fired, and there was no mutual agreement about the reason for his departure. (Answer)

At his hearing, however, Applicant acknowledged, that his given reason of wanting to spend more time with his family “was not entirely true.” (Tr. 92) He acknowledged that, while he had not been terminated, he quit because of the rumor that

he would be fired. (Tr. 80-81) He denied that he left after a “mutual agreement” following allegations of misconduct or poor performance. (Tr. 82-83)

When Applicant submitted his second SCA (GE 2) in June 2020, he did not change any of the information he had previously provided on his prior application (GE 1) about his departure from Company M. (GE 2 at 19). He acknowledged that he “glazed over” the information on GE 2 and did not review it as closely as he should have. (Tr. 94) Falsification of that question on GE 2, as to Company M, is not alleged in the SOR.

In disclosing the job with Contractor T on GE 2, Applicant listed the name of his supervisor, Ms. L, but did not list the name of the company, and did not report that he had been terminated. He wrote that he “left for new employment because I was hired for an entirely different job than what my employment title stated. . . .” (GE 2 at 16) He answered “No” to the next question, asking if for this employment, he had been fired, quit after being told he would be fired, or left by mutual agreement following charges or allegations of misconduct, or notice of unsatisfactory performance. (GE 2 at 17)

SOR ¶ 2.d alleges that Applicant’s stated reason for leaving Contractor J and his negative answer to the next question on GE 2 were deliberately false. In his Answer, Applicant admitted the allegation, and said, “I honestly don’t know why I tried to conceal this particular information, and it was stupid to try and do so, especially when I know the truth. . . .” He noted that he later volunteered the information to the investigator. He also said his given reason was not “entirely false” since he had another job that he interviewed for and began soon thereafter. (Answer) When asked about this at his hearing, he offered no excuse and said it was a poor decision. He acknowledged that his termination related to an allegation of falsified time cards, but he again denied that he did so. (Tr. 106-107)

Applicant did not have a background interview after his first SCA. (Tr. 47) Following his second SCA, he was twice interviewed in July 2020. During the second such interview, he denied facing any disciplinary actions or suspensions in the previous 10 years, and he said he had not quit a job after being told he would be fired. He also did not disclose his timesheet falsification at Company M until he was confronted about it by the interviewer. (Tr. 84-85; GE 3 at 8-9)

Later the same day, in July 2020, Applicant called the interviewer and volunteered that he had been terminated from Contractor T in February 2020 following an allegation of stealing time. He said he was removed from the contract after the government contractor compared the times he times he entered and left the building with his CAC card against his timesheet and there were discrepancies. Applicant denied the allegation that he had stolen time. (GE 3 at 11-12; Tr. 88, 107-109)

Applicant earns a \$102,000 salary for contractor J (full-time) and a \$74,000 salary for company IM (also full time). His two jobs are about 20 miles apart in the suburbs of the large metropolitan area where he works. (Tr. 111-112) He attested that there is no risk of future recurrence. He said both employers know he works two jobs,

and have no issue with it. He loves his job as a contractor with the AGA, has worked there for almost three years, and has had no disciplinary issues. Previously, he acknowledged that he was “trying to do too much.” (Tr. 113-114)

Applicant said he has learned from his mistakes. He acknowledged that he did make good decisions at the time. He is maturing and trying to make better decisions. If he is tired or overworked, he needs to cut back. It is not worth trying to cheat people. It puts his team in a bad position and “that’s not right.” (Tr. 127) He apologized for his actions as he concluded. (Tr. 131)

AE A is a December 2019 email in which Applicant inquired about being rehired by Company M. He was told there were no weekend positions available.

Applicant provided eight recommendation letters from references. All but one of them are from co-workers and supervisors from his contractor position with the AGA, including the office’s chief of staff, executive officer (a major general), a major, the chief information officer, the lead IT analyst, the chief of personnel, and an executive assistant. They attest that Applicant is exceptionally reliable and trustworthy, remarkably dependable, and an innovative problem solver. He has integrity, and his references all endorse his eligibility for a clearance. A final reference, from a job Applicant held at a fitness center, also attested to his positive character and work ethic. (AE G – AE N)

Policies

It is well established that no one has a right to a security clearance. As the Supreme Court has held, “the clearly consistent standard indicates that security determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” *Department of Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).

When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security

eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have not drawn inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel and has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.”

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Analysis

Guideline E, Personal Conduct

AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern for personal conduct:

Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative proceedings. . .

AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. The following disqualifying conditions are potentially applicable:

(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;

(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information; or concealing or omitting information, concerning relevant facts to an employer . . . ; and

(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of: . . .

(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and

(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources.

While working for Company M, in the summer of 2019, Applicant was found to have clocked in and clocked out remotely at the start and end of his shift, on multiple occasions and then found to have showed up late, and left early, even hours early. Applicant also admitted that on multiple occasions, he submitted time for eight-hour shifts he did not work, thereby falsely representing to his employer that he worked a full 40-hour-work week (and, accordingly, was paid for it when he should not have been). He was working two jobs at the time, working days for a federal contractor and nights or weekends for healthcare Company M. He was burning the candle at both ends and not fulfilling his obligations to work the required hours. He got caught, was confronted, sent home, and soon heard a rumor that he had been terminated. If he had not yet been terminated, he was probably about to be. Rather than wait until Monday to confirm this, Applicant chose to resign over the weekend. SOR ¶ 1.a is established. AG ¶¶ 16(b), 16(d)(3) and 16(d)(4) apply.

In SOR ¶ 1.b, the Government alleged that Applicant was terminated from his employment with contractor T in February 2020 for falsification of time records. Applicant consistently denied the allegation. He acknowledged that there was a dispute or discrepancy between his hours and the log-in or badge-in data at the job, though that data is not in the record. He disputed that he engaged in falsifying time records, noting that he it would be "stupid" to do at his next job what got him in trouble at his prior job. He also noted that he was paid for the time at issue after he left.

The record therefore establishes that Applicant was terminated by Contractor T, in February 2020. By his own admission, he was terminated following an allegation of stealing time. However, whether he actually did so at Contractor T is not established. In denying SOR ¶ 1.b, Applicant put the burden on the Government to establish it. The Government did not done so. SOR ¶ 1.b is not established.

Applicant denies SOR ¶ 1.c on the grounds that the circumstances of his departure from Company M were not reportable on GE 1, because, he asserts, he was not fired, he did not quit after being told he would be fired, and he did not leave by

mutual agreement following allegations of misconduct or poor performance. He asserts that since he resigned before confirming the rumor that he had been terminated, his action was not reportable. This is hairsplitting at best, and given that he resigned on a Saturday and in his own words, the “race was on” (before he could be fired, as suggested strongly by GE 4). His excuse for not reporting this incident is not credible. Further, his other statement on GE 1, that he left the job to spend more time with his family, is simply false. I therefore find that Applicant made at least one deliberately false statement on GE 1 as to his departure from Company M. SOR ¶ 1.c is established, and AG ¶ 16(a) applies.

A security clearance investigation is not a forum for an applicant to split hairs or parse the truth narrowly. The government has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information. That compelling interest includes the government's legitimate interest in being able to make sound decisions, based on complete and accurate information, about who will be granted access to classified information. An applicant who deliberately fails to give full, frank, and candid answers to the government in connection with a security clearance investigation or adjudication interferes with the integrity of the industrial security program. ISCR Case No. 01-03132 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 8, 2002)

Applicant admitted SOR ¶ 1.d, concerning his failure to disclose his termination from Contractor T in February 2020 on GE 2. Even if the alleged reason for the termination is not established, he had a duty to disclose it. He did not, and admitted failing to do so deliberately, without an excuse. AG ¶ 16(a) applies.

AG ¶ 17 sets forth potentially applicable mitigating conditions under Guideline E:

- (a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment of falsification before being confronted with the facts;
- (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and
- (d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur.

Applicant made false statements on two clearance applications, one in 2019 and one in 2020, about the circumstances under which he departed from two recent jobs, also in 2019 and 2020. AG ¶ 17(c) does not apply to the allegations of falsification.

Applicant resigned from Company M after he was confronted about logging in before showing up to work and logging off several hours early. He also submitted records of eight hours of work he never did on several occasions. He did so because he was leaving his night job early to get to his day job as a federal contractor. Even now, Applicant is again working two jobs, and two 40-hour-a week jobs at that. This means that there is a reasonable and foreseeable risk that he will once again become overextended. Even though he is now salaried instead of an hourly employee, there remains a risk that Applicant will find himself in a similar situation and exercise poor judgment in terms of managing his time, workload, or compliance with rules and regulations. While I credit his numerous letters of recommendation from his Army supervisors attesting to his judgment, trustworthiness, and reliability, he has not shown that his actions happened under such unique circumstances that they are unlikely to recur and do not cast doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. AG ¶¶ 17(c) and 17(d) do not apply to mitigate SOR ¶ 1.a.

Applicant is given credit under AG ¶ 17(a) for voluntarily disclosing to the investigator the fact of the second termination, and the fact that it concerned a (disputed) allegation of falsifying time records. However, this is not enough to mitigate his other conduct.

Whole-Person Concept

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

- (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
- (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
- (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct;
- (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
- (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary;
- (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes;
- (7) the motivation for the conduct;
- (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
- (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline E in my whole-person analysis. As noted, I considered the numerous letters of recommendation Applicant provided, from a wide variety of people at work who know him well. He was also remorseful, and now better understands the problems with what he did. But that evidence in mitigation must be balanced against his pattern of conduct, including falsifications and work-related rule violations, and the risk of recurrence.

Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant's eligibility for continued access to classified information.

Formal Findings

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline E:	AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a, 1.c, 1.d:	Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b:	For Applicant

Conclusion

In light of all of the circumstances presented, it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant's access to classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Braden M. Murphy
Administrative Judge