

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS



In the matter of:

ISCR Case No. 23-01694

Applicant for Security Clearance

Appearances

For Government: Jeff Nagel, Esquire, Department Counsel For Applicant: *Pro se*

08/01/2024

Decision

CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge:

On August 3, 2022, Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for (e-QIP). Investigations Processing On January 17, 2024, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency Consolidated Adjudication Services (DCSA CAS) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse), and Guideline J (Criminal Conduct). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines effective June 8. 2017.

Applicant answered the SOR in writing on January 22, 2024, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) received the request soon thereafter. I received the case assignment on February 29, 2024. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on March 29, 2024, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on April 12, 2024. The Government offered Exhibits

(GXs) 1 and 2, which were received without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf, submitted Applicant Exhibits (AppXs) A~F, and asked that the record be kept open until May 10, 2024, for the receipt of additional documentation. On April 12, 2024, the day of, but after the Hearing, Applicant submitted a closing statement. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on April 25, 2024. Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Findings of Fact

In his Answer to the SOR Applicant admitted the factual allegations in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SOR, with explanations. At the hearing, the Government amended the SOR to add "1.c." to subparagraph 2.a., which now reads: "a. Information as set forth in subparagraphs 1.a., 1.b, and 1.c, above."

Applicant is 34 years old, unmarried, and has no children. He has a high school diploma. At the time of his hearing, Applicant had worked for a defense contractor for "a year and one month. (TR at page 17 line 23 to page 19 line 9, and GX 1 at page 5.)

Guideline H – Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse & Guideline J - Criminal Conduct

1.a. and 2.a. From 2004, when Applicant was 14 years old, until February of 2015, a period of about ten years, Applicant used methamphetamines numerous times, on a daily basis. He estimates his total usage to be at least 20,000 times, "probably even more." (TR at page 21 line 5 to page 23 line 16, and at page 24 line 21 to page 25 line 22.) Applicant also used cocaine once during that ten-year period. (TR at page 24 lines 7~10.) He denies ever knowingly using marijuana. (TR at page 24 lines 12~20.)

1.b. and 2.a. Applicant purchased methamphetamines on countless occasions to support, which he now admits was an addiction to the illegal substance.

1.c. and 2.a. Applicant admits "falling off the wagon," and using methamphetamines several times during a day in April of 2021. (TR at page 24 lines 1~6, and at page 27 line 19 to page 28 line 19.)

Policies

When evaluating an applicant's suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an applicant's eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in AG \P 2 describing the adjudicative process. The

administrative judge's overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG \P 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG \P 2(b) requires that "[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security." In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an "applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision."

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." *See also* EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

Analysis

Guideline H - Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse

The security concern relating to the guideline for Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse is set forth at AG \P 24:

The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior

may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. *Controlled substance* means any "controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. *Substance misuse* is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above.

The guideline at AG ¶ 25 contains seven conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. Two conditions are established:

(a) any substance misuse (see above definition); and

(c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia.

Appellant used methamphetamines over 20,000 times from 2004~2015. He purchased the drug on countless occasions during this 10~11-year period. Applicant also relapsed and used meth once in April 2021, about three years ago. (His one-time use of cocaine is de minimis.) Therefore, AG \P 25 (a) and (c) are established.

The guideline at AG ¶ 26 contains four conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Two conditions may be applicable:

(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and

(b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to:

(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;

(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and

(3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility. These mitigating conditions do not apply. Applicant "fell off the wagon" about three years prior to his hearing. His methamphetamine usage from 2004~2015 was clearly addictive, over 20,000 usages, although there is no formal diagnosis of a substance use disorder. His use of cocaine only occurred once many years ago and is of no present security concern. Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse is found against Applicant.

Guideline J - Criminal Conduct

The security concern relating to the guideline for Criminal Conduct is set out in AG \P 30:

Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.

The guideline at AG ¶ 31 contains five disqualifying conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. Two conditions apply, as discussed below:

(a) a pattern of minor offenses, any one of which on its own would be unlikely to affect a national security eligibility decision, but which in combination cast doubt on the individual's judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; and

(b) evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible allegation, an admission, and matters of official record) of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted.

Applicant admittedly purchased and used an illegal substance, methamphetamines, from 2004 until his last usage in 2021. This evidence raises security concerns under these disqualifying conditions, thereby shifting the burden to Applicant to rebut, extenuate, or mitigate those concerns.

The guideline in AG ¶ 32 contains four conditions that could mitigate criminal conduct security concerns:

(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;

(b) the individual was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in the person's life;

(c) no reliable evidence to support that the individual committed the offense; and

(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement.

Sufficient time has not passed since Applicant's most-recent 2021 use of methamphetamines, when coupled with his ten-plus year history involving at least 20,000 times of illegal usage and purchases. Based on those facts, the evidence continues to cast doubt on Applicant's reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. The evidence does not establish mitigation under any of the above conditions. Criminal Conduct is found against Applicant.

Whole-Person Concept

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant's conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG \P 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

AG \P 2(b) requires each case must be judged on its own merits. Under AG \P 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. Applicant is respected in the workplace. (AppXs A~F.) However, overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant's eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns arising from his drug involvement and substance abuse, and his criminal conduct.

Formal Findings

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline H:	AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a~1.c:	Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline J:	AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a:	Against Applicant

Conclusion

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Richard A. Cefola Administrative Judge