

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS



In the matter of:

[Redacted]

ISCR Case No. 24-01403

Applicant for Security Clearance

# Appearances

For Government: Cynthia Ruckno, Esq., Department Counsel For Applicant: *Pro se* 

01/29/2025

Decision

FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge:

This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines F (Financial Considerations). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

## Statement of the Case

Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on December 21, 2018. On August 22, 2024, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline F. The DCSA acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, *National Security Adjudicative Guidelines* (December 10, 2016), which became effective on June 8, 2017.

Applicant answered the SOR on September 28, 2024, and requested a decision on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government's written case on October 11, 2024, and sent a complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) to Applicant, who was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government's evidence. He received the FORM on November 4, 2024, and did not respond. The case was assigned to me on January 15, 2024.

The FORM consists of eight items. Items 1 and 2 are the pleadings in the case. Items 3 through 8 are the evidence submitted by Department Counsel in support of the allegations in the SOR. FORM Item 8 is a summary of a personal subject interview (PSI) conducted on February 18, 2019 (FORM Item 8). The PSI summary was not authenticated as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.20. Department Counsel informed Applicant that he was entitled to comment on the accuracy of the PSI summary; make any corrections, additions, deletions, or updates; or object to consideration of the PSI summary on the ground that it was not authenticated. I conclude that he waived any objections to the PSI summary by failing to respond to the FORM. "Although *pro se* applicants are not expected to act like lawyers, they are expected to take timely and reasonable steps to protect their rights under the Directive." ISCR Case No. 12-10810 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 12, 2016). FORM Items 3 through 8 are admitted in evidence.

#### Findings of Fact

In Applicant's answer to the SOR, he admitted all the allegations the SOR. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact.

Applicant is a 34-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from March 2009 to April 2014 and received an honorable discharge. He held a security clearance in the Marine Corps. He married in October 2010 and separated in October 2014. He did not list any children in his SCA. However, in the PSI, he disclosed that he divorced in "about 2015," is obligated to pay child support of \$500 per month, and is current on that obligation. (Item 8 at 6)

The SOR alleges four delinquent debts reflected in credit reports from June 2024, January 2022, and January 2019. (FORM Items 4, 5, and 6) The evidence regarding these debts is summarized below.

**SOR ¶ 1.a: delinquent rent placed for collection of \$3,438.** Applicant has taken no action to resolve this debt. (FORM Item 4 at 2)

**SOR ¶ 1.b: damage to rental property, placed for collection of \$1,096.** In the PSI, Applicant stated that he had paid the rent in full when he vacated the premises, and he assumed that this debt was for damage to the rental property. He has not communicated with the rental agency or the collection company or taken any action to resolve the debt. (FORM Item 8 at 6)

**SOR ¶ 1.c: car loan charged off for \$14,442**. Applicant surrendered this vehicle in mid-1916, when he could not afford to make the payments. He has taken no action to resolve this debt. (FORM Item 6 at 10; FORM Item 8 at 5)

**SOR ¶ 1.d: bank overdraft charged off for \$2,539**. The January 2022 credit report reflects that this debt has been paid. (FORM Item 5 at 2)

#### Policies

"[N]o one has a 'right' to a security clearance." *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to "control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information." *Id.* at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information "only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so." Exec. Or. 10865 § 2.

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge's overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Clearance decisions must be made "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. *See Egan* at 531. Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record." See ISCR Case No. 17-04166 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 21, 2019) It is "less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence." *Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n*, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). "Substantial evidence" is "more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." *See v. Washington Metro. Area* 

*Transit Auth.*, 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant's security suitability. ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016).

Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).

An applicant "has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance." ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). "[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials." *Egan* at 531.

#### Analysis

#### **Guideline F, Financial Considerations**

The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18:

Failure to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.... An individual who is financially overextended is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds....

This concern is broader than the possibility that a person might knowingly compromise classified information to raise money. It encompasses concerns about a person's self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting classified information. A person who is financially irresponsible may also be irresponsible, unconcerned, or negligent in handling and safeguarding classified information. See ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012).

Applicant's admissions and the evidence in the FORM establish the two disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG  $\P$  19(a) ("inability to satisfy debts") and AG  $\P$  19(c) ("a history of not meeting financial obligations").

The following mitigating conditions are potentially relevant:

AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;

AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;

AG ¶ 20(c): the individual has received or is receiving financial counseling for the problem from a legitimate and credible source, such as a non-profit credit counseling service, and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;

AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts; and

AG ¶ 20(e): the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue.

AG ¶ 20(d) is established for the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 1.d. None of these mitigating factors are established for the debts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.c, which are numerous, recent, and were not incurred under circumstances making recurrence unlikely. He has not sought or received financial counseling. He has not disputed any of the debts.

### Whole-Person Concept

Under AG  $\P$  2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG  $\P$  2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

I have incorporated my comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG  $\P$  2(d). Because Applicant requested a

determination on the record without a hearing, I had no opportunity to evaluate his credibility and sincerity based on demeanor. See ISCR Case No. 01-12350 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Jul. 23, 2003). After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline F and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by his delinquent debts.

## Formal Findings

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR:

Paragraph 1, Guideline F (Financial Considerations): AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d:

Against Applicant

## Conclusion

I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is denied.

LeRoy F. Foreman Administrative Judge