



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**



## Appearances

For Government: Mark D. Lawton, Esq., Department Counsel  
For Applicant: *Pro se*

12/09/2025

## Decision

BORGSTROM, Eric H., Administrative Judge:

Applicant mitigated the drug involvement, criminal conduct, and personal conduct security concerns. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

## **Statement of the Case**

On November 26, 2024, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline H (drug involvement and substance misuse) and Guideline J (criminal conduct). The DCSA acted under Executive Order (EO) 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on June 8, 2017.

By emails dated January 2, 2025 and January 3, 2025, Applicant responded to the SOR. He admitted all five allegations, and he attached a list of references and five character-reference letters. He requested a hearing before a Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) administrative judge. (Answer)

On February 28, 2025, the Government was ready to proceed to a hearing. I was assigned this case on June 3, 2025. On July 16, 2025, a notice was issued scheduling the hearing for August 21, 2025, by video teleconference. The hearing proceeded as scheduled. The Government proffered five evidentiary exhibits, which I admitted as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 5, without objection. Applicant and four witnesses testified. Applicant submitted two exhibits, which I admitted as Applicant Exhibits (AE) A and B, without objection. I held the record open until September 25, 2025, to give Applicant the opportunity to provide any other additional evidence and to further respond to Department Counsel's amendment to the SOR, *infra*. I received the transcript (Tr.) on August 29, 2025.

On September 24, 2025, Applicant emailed four additional exhibits. I admitted the email and four attachments as AE C through G, without objection. The record closed on September 24, 2025. My decision was delayed when all administrative judges were furloughed from October 1 through November 12, 2025, during a federal government shutdown due to a lapse in federal funding.

### **Amendment to the SOR**

At the outset of the hearing, Department Counsel moved to amend the SOR, pursuant to Paragraph E3.1.17 of the Directive, to cross-allege the conduct alleged in SOR ¶ 2.b. (the adulteration of the urine sample) under Guideline E (personal conduct). Applicant had notice that this conduct would be at issue for his clearance determination, and he had an opportunity both at hearing and in his post-hearing submissions to respond in the context of Guideline E. Following the conclusion of the hearing, Department Counsel submitted the motion to amend (Amendment to the SOR) in writing. Applicant did not object to the motion to amend, either at hearing or in his post-hearing submissions. He was provided 30 days to submit any response and to supplement the evidentiary record. (Tr. 18-23)

### **Findings of Fact**

Applicant is 32 years old. He graduated from high school in December 2010 and attended some college courses from August 2014 to November 2016. He married in July 2025, and he resides with his wife and their four-year-old child. (GE 1; Tr. 89)

From February 2012 to November 2016, Applicant served part time in the Air Force Reserve, from which he was honorably discharged. He was granted a secret clearance in about April 2012. From November 2016 to about July 2023, he served in the Air National Guard (ANG), from which he was honorably discharged as a staff sergeant (E-5). He initially served in an Active-Guard-Reserve (AGR) full-time status for a few months before transitioning to a full-time federal technician role and serving part time in the ANG. From March 2017 to October 2023, he was employed full time as a federal technician with the Air National Guard. Since October 2023, he has been employed full time as a technician with a DOD contractor. (GE 1, GE 5; Tr. 90-92)

Experiencing the stressors from work and as a new parent, Applicant used products containing tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or cannabidiol (CBD) for approximately six weeks between mid-September 2022 and November 5, 2022. At the hearing, he explained that he sought an alternative to alcohol to relax. He used THC – ingested as an edible or inhaled through vape fluid – and consumed CBD drinks. The CBD drinks were purchased at local retail establishments, and the THC-infused items were provided by or purchased from a friend. Applicant estimated that he used these products about three to five times a week or 25 times in all. He testified that he had used marijuana in high school (prior to December 2010) but had not used any illegal drugs between December 2010 and September 2022 and had not used any illegal drugs since November 5, 2022. He was aware that any THC use was prohibited as an ANG member, federal technician, and a clearance holder, and he was aware that CBD use, though legal, may cause an individual to test positive for THC. (Answer; GE 1; Tr. 92-96, 103-107)

On November 5, 2022, Applicant reported for his monthly drill obligation, and he was required to participate in a random drug test. Prior to reporting for drill, he had purchased “synthetic urine” from a brick-and-mortar store in case he was required to participate in a drug test. During testing, he had hidden the small bottle of synthetic urine in his waistband. Believing the test observer would discover him using the synthetic urine, he aborted his attempt to adulterate his urine sample and supplied his own urine for the test. Upon leaving the restroom, he dropped the cap of the bottle of synthetic urine, as was witnessed by the test observer. (Answer; GE 2-4; Tr. 95-98, 110-111)

The observer notified his supervisor shortly thereafter, and Applicant submitted a statement on November 5, 2022, admitting he “was caught attempting to provide a fake urine sample.” He further admitted that he had intended to use a small vial of fake urine to adulterate the drug urinalysis due to his fear of testing positive for THC. The records also included a statement from the urinalysis observer, who witnessed Applicant drop the red cap of a bottle or container as he was providing a urine sample. Applicant tested positive for THC-8 and THC-9 from his sample collected on November 5, 2022. When he reported for drill in December 2022, he was formally confronted about the positive drug test, and he admitted having used THC. (GE 2-3; Tr. 98-99)

In January 2023, Applicant was charged with two offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Specifically, he was charged with wrongful use of a controlled substance (Article 112a) and failure to obey order or regulation (Article 92). The Article 92 specification was based on Applicant’s attempt to provide an “improper urine sample that did not come directly from [his] body.” He pled guilty and was reduced in rank for these offenses. As a result of his failed urinalysis, a separation board was convened; however, Applicant was granted a conditional waiver and was honorably discharged from the ANG in July 2023. (Answer; GE 1-3; Tr. 99-100)

From February 14, 2023 to April 20, 2023, Applicant voluntarily participated in a substance abuse intensive outpatient program (IOP) that consisted of individual counseling once a week, group counseling three times a week, and three Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings a week. The IOP clinical director confirmed that Applicant

passed the weekly drug screenings and “was compliant in all aspects of treatment.” The discharge plan recommended that he continue with individual counseling, family counseling, attend recovery-support groups, and participate in a continuing care group. Applicant testified that he was actively engaged in individual counseling and has found it very helpful. He also has relied upon his family and friends for support. He has attended some AA meetings and has kept in contact with AA members whom he met through those meetings. (AE A, AE D; Tr. 100-101, 119)

On July 24, 2023, Applicant submitted a statement concerning his marijuana use and failed drug urinalysis as part of the separation proceedings. He admitted that he had been escorted to security forces on December 3, 2022, due to his failed urinalysis. In his statement, he admitted that he had consumed THC gummies and from a vape pen for “two weeks” prior to his November 5, 2022 urinalysis. He averred that he had not used marijuana since the November 5, 2022 test and that he had voluntarily completed a substance abuse IOP. At the security clearance hearing, Applicant admitted that he had minimized the length of his marijuana use to two weeks instead of six weeks because he had been “scared” about his impending separation from the ANG. (GE 4; Tr. 121)

On February 2, 2024, Applicant certified and submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP). Under Section 15 – Military History, he reported his two UCMJ offenses, the separation proceeding, and his reduction in rank. Under Section 23 – Illegal Use of Drugs or Drug Activity, Applicant reported that he had used marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) “every night” for about six weeks between September 2022 and November 2022. He admitted that this use occurred while he possessed a security clearance. He further admitted that he had purchased the THC on multiple occasions. He also reported his participation in substance abuse treatment at an Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP) from February to April 2023. He stated his intent to abstain from illegal drugs in the future. (GE 1)

In his Answer, Applicant acknowledged his “critical error in judgment” and apologized for his actions. He has attended “many recovery meetings” and has “the tools/resources to abstain from drugs and alcohol.” In his post-hearing email, he reiterated his admissions of poor judgment, and he provided documentation of three recent drug urinalyses and an updated letter from his completed IOP. He has not used any illegal drugs since November 2022, and he has had no contact since about November 2022 with the friend who had provided him the THC. He has not associated with anyone, including friends, family members, and co-workers, who uses illegal drugs for at least two years. Applicant passed a pre-employment drug test in about October 2023, and he submitted negative drug screenings from August 15, 2025, September 11, 2025, and September 24, 2025. Applicant’s wife, family, and friends are aware of his previous THC use, the failed drug test, and the attempted adulteration of his urine sample. (Answer; AE B, C, E-G; Tr. 107-116)

## **Whole Person**

Four witnesses – all of whom were aware of Applicant’s failed drug urinalysis and attempt to adulterate his urine sample – testified in favor of Applicant’s clearance eligibility. His current and former supervisors with the DOD contractor both previously served in the military. They praised Applicant’s work performance, work ethic, dependability, integrity, and accountability, and they noted that he had repeatedly received awards from his supervisors and peers for his work. A current co-worker, who inspects the quality of Applicant’s work, described him as an excellent employee. There is no evidence of any disciplinary actions or security infractions while employed with the DOD contractor. (Tr. 37-72)

Most compelling was the testimony of Applicant’s fourth witness – a retired brigadier general with the ANG now employed with the DOD contractor. He currently interacts daily with Applicant. He characterized Applicant’s work performance as “outstanding” and considered Applicant to be a perfectionist. Of the over 1500 service members he commanded, this witness has only testified in support of three airmen’s clearance eligibility, including Applicant’s. The witness testified:

He is an impeccable individual who, as airmen do, make mistakes and make dumb mistakes. But to [Applicant’s] credit, he’s accountable for it. He’s dealing with the consequences. And if he gets his clearance back, that would be wonderful, because he could continue to contribute either to [the DOD contractor] or if – I’d love to see him back in the – in the military.” (Tr. 76-84)

Applicant proffered five character-reference letters in support of his clearance eligibility, including four letters from his ANG leadership. All five references were aware of his failed drug urinalysis, his attempt to adulterate his urine sample, and, to some degree, his THC use. They praised Applicant’s “unmatched work ethic,” leadership, integrity, professionalism, and trustworthiness. They had been shocked by his misconduct but noted his accountability for his actions. (Answer; AE B)

Applicant’s former ANG commander recommended that he retain his security clearance notwithstanding the seriousness of his misconduct:

As [Applicant’s] Commanding Officer at the time, I was privy to all the details surrounding his actions outlined in the discharge documentation and am undeterred in my full endorsement of his continued ability to be trusted with sensitive material. My support is rooted in the fact that [Applicant] took full responsibility for his actions when confronted, demonstrated genuine and deep remorse, took deliberate corrective actions and steps at self-improvement, and was truthful and transparent throughout the entire process from beginning to end. I am also aware that his wife and family know everything that occurred and are still his biggest supporters which eliminates any risk of exploitation or manipulation/coercion. (Answer)

## Policies

When evaluating an applicant's suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant's eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge's overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the "whole-person concept." The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that "[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security."

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting "witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel." The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.

A person who seeks access to sensitive information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to sensitive information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard sensitive information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of sensitive information.

Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

## Analysis

### **Guideline H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse**

The security concern for drug involvement is set out in AG ¶ 24:

The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. *Controlled substance* means any "controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. *Substance misuse* is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 25. The following are potentially applicable:

- (a) any substance misuse;
- (b) testing positive for an illegal drug; and
- (f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position.<sup>1</sup>

Marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance under Federal law pursuant to Title 21, Section 812 of the United States Code. Schedule I drugs are those which have a high potential for abuse; have no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; and lack accepted safety for use of the drug under medical supervision. Section 844 under Title 21 of the United States Code makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance not obtained pursuant to a valid prescription.

On October 25, 2014, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued guidance that changes to laws by some states and the District of Columbia to legalize or decriminalize the recreational use of marijuana do not alter existing Federal law or the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, and that an individual's disregard of Federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security eligibility determinations.

On December 21, 2021, the then DNI issued clarifying guidance concerning marijuana, noting that prior recreational use of marijuana by an individual may be relevant to security adjudications, but is not determinative in the whole-person evaluation. Relevant factors in mitigation include the frequency of use and whether the individual can demonstrate that future use is unlikely to recur.

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<sup>1</sup> Applicant's illegal purchase and possession of marijuana were not alleged, therefore, I cannot consider the application of AG ¶ 25(c) [illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia].

Applicant admitted his illegal use of marijuana while possessing a security clearance and his failed drug urinalysis. AG ¶¶ 25(a), 25(b), and 25(f) apply.

Conditions that could mitigate the drug involvement security concerns are provided under AG ¶ 26. The following are potentially applicable:

(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and

(b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to:

(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;

(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and

(3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility.

Applicant was fully aware that his purchase and use of THC-infused edibles and vape fluid were illegal and prohibited as an ANG service member and clearance holder. His attempt to adulterate his urine sample is a significant aggravating factor in this case. That said, there is no other evidence of illegal drug use or substance misuse – outside of this six-week window – in the past 15 years. Similarly, there is no evidence of any other failed drug screenings or efforts to adulterate screenings. He admitted his attempt to adulterate his urine sample that same day, and he admitted the full extent of his marijuana use throughout his clearance process. He voluntarily completed a substance abuse IOP, learned coping tools, and has implemented the aftercare recommendations for individual counseling and attendance at AA meetings. He openly discussed his misconduct with his family and friends and with his current and former supervisors who testified on behalf of clearance eligibility. There is no evidence of any drug involvement or association with drug users since November 2022, and he clearly stated his intent to abstain from illegal drugs in his e-QIP, his Answer, and during his testimony. AG ¶¶ 26(a) and 26(b) apply.

I do not take lightly the gravity of either Applicant's marijuana use while possessing a security clearance and in a sensitive position or his attempt to adulterate his urine sample. I likewise take notice of how he minimized his marijuana use in his July 2023 statement. That said, there is no other evidence of misconduct or questionable judgment during his military or civilian careers. Furthermore, he was experiencing the pressures of fatherhood and the potential impact to his military and civilian careers when confronted about his marijuana use. He has since engaged counseling, learned coping tools during

the IOP, and has been open with his family, friends, and supervisors. Applicant mitigated the drug involvement and substance misuse security concerns.

### **Guideline J: Criminal Conduct**

The security concern for criminal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 30:

Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.

AG ¶ 31 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. The following is potentially applicable:

(b) evidence (including, but not limited to, a credible allegation, an admission, and matters of official record) of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the individual was formally charged, prosecuted, or convicted.

Applicant was charged with two UCMJ offenses for his marijuana use and his attempted adulteration of his urine sample. He pled guilty and was reduced in rank. He also admitted illegal drug use on approximately 25 occasions between mid-September 2022 and early November 2022. AG ¶ 31(b) applies.

Conditions that could mitigate criminal conduct security concerns are provided under AG ¶ 32. The following are potentially applicable:

(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and

(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including, but not limited to, the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, restitution, compliance with the terms of parole or probation, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement.

Applicant's criminal conduct occurred over three years ago. Although he minimized the span of his marijuana use in his July 2023 statement, there is no other evidence of any other criminal conduct, questionable judgment, disciplinary actions, or security infractions in the past 15 years. He provided substantial evidence of rehabilitation through his witness testimony and his character-reference letters. He has received multiple awards for his work performance with his current employer. He is currently engaged in individual counseling and has been open with his family, friends, and supervisors about his past misconduct. AG ¶¶ 32(a) and 32(d) apply.

## **Guideline E: Personal Conduct**

The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15:

Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. . . .

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 16. The following disqualifying condition is potentially applicable in this case:

(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the individual may not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of:

- (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations.

The SOR was amended to cross-allege Applicant's attempted adulteration of his urine sample (SOR ¶ 2.b.) as a personal conduct security concern (SOR ¶ 3.a.). This conduct was alleged and addressed under Guideline J; however, it may also be considered here. Concerned about his upcoming drill obligation, Applicant purchased "synthetic urine" prior to reporting for drill. After he was required to participate in a random drug urinalysis, he brought the small bottle of "synthetic urine" into the testing area with the intention of using it to conceal his marijuana use. Although he aborted this attempt for fear of discovery, he took actions in an attempt to adulterate his urine sample. AG ¶ 16(d)(3) applies.

The following personal conduct mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 17 are potentially relevant:

(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and

(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that contributed to untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur.

The Guideline E mitigation analysis mirrors that of Guideline H, *supra*. Applicant has engaged in individual counseling, which he has found helpful. He has disclosed his marijuana use, his failed drug test, and his attempt to adulterate his urine sample to his spouse, family, friends, and supervisors. As discussed above, I have considered the gravity of his marijuana use while possessing a security clearance and his attempt to conceal that use by adulterating his urine sample. I have also considered his aforethought in purchasing the synthetic urine. For the reasons delineated within the Guideline H mitigating analysis, *supra*, I conclude that Applicant has taken positive steps to alleviate the stressors and to implement coping tools such that his misconduct is unlikely to recur. AG ¶¶ 17(c) and 17(d) apply. Applicant mitigated the personal conduct security concerns.

### **Whole-Person Concept**

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for access to classified information by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

- (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline H, Guideline J, Guideline E, and the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) in this whole-person analysis.

Applicant has thrived in his new career with a DOD contractor. I found his testimony credible and sincere. I found the testimony of his witnesses and the character-reference letters even more compelling. Applicant's former commander, a retired brigadier general with the ANG, who, though aware of Applicant's misconduct, described Applicant as an "impeccable individual" who has taken accountability for his mistakes. His former commanding officer, likewise privy to Applicant's misconduct, was "undeterred in [his] full endorsement of [Applicant's] continued ability to be trusted with sensitive material." These individuals did not make these endorsements lightly, and they are bolstered by the references of Applicant's current and former supervisors with the DOD contractor.

As discussed at length above, I have considered the gravity of Applicant's misconduct and have applied the appropriate strict scrutiny and high threshold to his evidence in mitigation. Taken with the strength of his endorsements, I found the isolated nature of Applicant's marijuana use and misconduct a critical element. Applicant mitigated the drug involvement, criminal conduct, and personal conduct security concerns.

### **Formal Findings**

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline H:	FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a.-1.b.:	For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline J:	FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a.-2.c.:	For Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E:	FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a.:	For Applicant

### **Conclusion**

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant's eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Eric H. Borgstrom  
Administrative Judge