



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**



In the matter of:)
)
) ISCR Case No. 24-02227
)
 Applicant for Security Clearance)

Appearances

For Government: Mark D. Lawton, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: *Pro se*

12/29/2025

Decision

Dorsey, Benjamin R., Administrative Judge:

Applicant did not mitigate the drug involvement and substance misuse security concerns. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Statement of the Case

On February 20, 2025, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline H, drug involvement and substance misuse. On March 21, 2025, Applicant responded to the SOR (Answer) and requested a decision based on the written record in lieu of a hearing.

The Government's written case was submitted on May 1, 2025. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was provided to Applicant, who was given 30 days to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns. Applicant received the FORM on June 17, 2025, but she did not respond to it. The case was assigned to me on November 26, 2025. The Government exhibits included in the FORM (Items 1-4) are admitted in evidence without objection.

Findings of Fact

Applicant is a 31-year-old employee of a government contractor for whom she has worked since December 2018. She earned a bachelor's degree in 2016 and a master's degree in 2022. She has been married since June 2023. The DOD granted her security clearance eligibility as of June 2023. (Items 2-4)

In the sole count, the DOD alleged in the SOR that Applicant used marijuana with varying frequency between May 2016 and September 2024, including while employed in a sensitive position. She admitted this allegation without additional comment in the Answer. Her admission is incorporated in my findings of fact. More specifically, the record evidence shows that she used marijuana with varying frequency from May 2016 until June 2016, around the time she graduated from college, and once on September 1, 2024. In a security clearance application that she certified in February 2023 (2023 SCA), she divulged her 2016 marijuana use and claimed that she had no intention to use it again. (Items 1, 2)

Applicant completed another security clearance application in February 2024 (2024 SCA). During a September 2024 security interview, which Applicant authenticated, she told the DOD investigator that she used marijuana once earlier that month to help with pain associated with a stomach ulcer. She obtained the marijuana from her husband, who used it with her. She stated that she knew it was wrong to use it and said that she had no intention to use it in the future. (Items 3, 4)

In Applicant's response to DOHA interrogatories, dated January 27, 2025, she divulged that she used marijuana once on September 1, 2024. She wrote that she became aware that marijuana use was illegal pursuant to federal law in June 2018 after researching it on the internet. She wrote that she does not intend to use marijuana in the future, but acknowledged that she associates with her husband, who occasionally uses marijuana in their home to help with chronic migraine headaches. She provided a copy of her employer's drug use policy, issued on December 1, 2022, entitled, "Drug and Alcohol Free Workplace Program," which she violated by using marijuana on September 1, 2024. She stated that she is subject to random drug testing through her employment but has never been tested for illegal drugs and has never failed a drug test. (Item 4)

Policies

This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), which became effective on June 8, 2017.

When evaluating an applicant's suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially

disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant's eligibility for access to classified information.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge's overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the "whole-person concept." The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that "[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security."

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting "witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel." The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

Analysis

Guideline H, Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse

The security concern for drug involvement and substance misuse is set out in AG ¶ 24:

The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an

individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. Controlled substance means any "controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. Substance misuse is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above.

On October 25, 2014, the Director of National Intelligence (the Security Executive Agent (SecEA)) issued DNI Memorandum ES 2014-00674, "*Adherence to Federal Laws Prohibiting Marijuana Use*," which states:

[C]hanges to state laws and the laws of the District of Columbia pertaining to marijuana use do not alter the existing National Security Adjudicative Guidelines An individual's disregard of federal law pertaining to the use, sale, or manufacture of marijuana remains adjudicatively relevant in national security determinations. As always, adjudicative authorities are expected to evaluate claimed or developed use of, or involvement with, marijuana using the current adjudicative criteria. The adjudicative authority must determine if the use of, or involvement with, marijuana raises questions about the individual's judgment, reliability, trustworthiness, and willingness to comply with law, rules, and regulations, including federal laws, when making eligibility decisions of persons proposed for, or occupying, sensitive national security positions.

On December 21, 2021, the SecEA promulgated clarifying guidance concerning marijuana-related issues in security clearance adjudications (*Security Executive Agent Clarifying Guidance Concerning Marijuana for Agencies Conducting Adjudications of Persons Proposed for Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Eligibility to Hold a Sensitive Position*). It states in pertinent part:

[Federal] agencies are instructed that prior recreational marijuana use by an individual may be relevant to adjudications but not determinative. The SecEA has provided direction in [the adjudicative guidelines] to agencies that require them to use a "whole-person concept." This requires adjudicators to carefully weigh a number of variables in an individual's life to determine whether that individual's behavior raises a security concern, if at all, and whether that concern has been mitigated such that the individual may now receive a favorable adjudicative determination. Relevant mitigations include, but are not limited to, frequency of use and whether the individual can demonstrate that future use is unlikely to recur, including by signing an attestation or other such appropriate mitigation. Additionally, in light of the long-standing federal law and policy prohibiting illegal drug use while occupying a sensitive position or holding a security clearance, agencies are encouraged to advise prospective national security workforce employees that they should refrain from any future marijuana use upon initiation of the national security vetting process, which commences once

the individual signs the certification contained in the Standard Form 86 (SF-86), Questionnaire for National Security Positions.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 25. The following are potentially applicable in this case:

- (a) any substance misuse (see above definition);
- (c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and
- (f) any illegal drug use while granted access to classified information or holding a sensitive position.

Applicant used (and therefore possessed) marijuana with varying frequency in May 2016 and again in September 2024. Her 2024 marijuana use occurred while she was employed in a sensitive position. AG ¶¶ 25(a), 25(c), and 25(f) are established.

AG ¶ 26 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. The following are potentially applicable:

- (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and
- (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to:
 - (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
 - (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and
 - (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility.

Despite the somewhat misleading (although technically accurate) language in the SOR, Applicant's marijuana use has been infrequent, with a gap of over eight years between her use in college in 2016, and her one-time use in September 2024. However, the circumstances surrounding her September 2024 use are problematic for her in her efforts to meet her burden of providing evidence in mitigation. Her last use was about a year ago and she was aware of marijuana's illegality under federal law. Prior to her 2024 use, she claimed that she would not use marijuana again after using it in 2016. She

violated her employer's drug-free workplace policy. She also still associates with her husband, who uses marijuana in their home, and from whom she obtained the marijuana she used in September 2024. For these reasons, I find that she has not met her evidentiary burden to prove her marijuana use is unlikely to recur or that she has established a sufficient period of abstinence. AG ¶¶ 26(a) and 26(b) do not apply.

Whole-Person Concept

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

- (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline H in my whole-person analysis.

Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts about Applicant's eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. I conclude she did not mitigate the drug involvement and substance misuse security concerns.

Formal Findings

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant

Conclusion

It is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Benjamin R. Dorsey
Administrative Judge