DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

In the matter of:	)	
	)	
	)	ISCR Case No. 22-02039
	)	
Applicant for Security Clearance	)	

Appearances

For Government: Nicholas Temple, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: *Pro se*

07/15/2026

Decision

PRICE, Eric C., Administrative Judge:

Security concerns under Guideline B (foreign influence) are mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Statement of the Case

Applicant submitted a security clearance application on April 9, 2022. On February 13, 2023, the Department of Defense (DoD) sent him a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline B. The DoD acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated in Security Executive Agent Directive 4, *National Security Adjudicative Guidelines* (December 10, 2016).

Applicant responded to the SOR on February 16, 2023, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. (Answer) The case was assigned to me on January 23, 2024. On April 11, 2024, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was scheduled to be conducted by video teleconference on May 2, 2024. I convened the hearing as scheduled.

Government Exhibit (GE) 1 and GE 2 were admitted in evidence without objection. (Transcript (Tr.) 14, 54-61; Hearing Exhibit (HE) I) Applicant and one witness testified. Applicant submitted Applicant Exhibit (AE) A through AE J, and I marked Applicant's emails as AE K and AE L. (Tr. 13; HE V) At hearing, Department Counsel was not offered an opportunity to object to AE A through AE L and those exhibits were not admitted into evidence. I kept the record open to enable the parties to submit additional documentary evidence. Applicant timely submitted AE M through AE CC, which were admitted in evidence without objection. (HE IV, HE V) DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on May 13, 2024, and the record closed on May 31, 2024. On July 7, 2026, I reopened the record to provide the parties with an opportunity to address AE A through AE L, which were then admitted in evidence without objection. The record closed on July 13, 2026. (HE V)

Administrative Notice

Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts about the State of Israel and the Palestinian Territories, dated April 25, 2024. (HE III) Without objection, I have taken administrative notice of the facts contained in the written request. (HE III; Tr. 54-59) The facts administratively noticed are set out below in my findings of fact.

Findings of Fact

The SOR alleges that Applicant has multiple family and financial connections to Israel. In Applicant's answer to the SOR, he admitted all SOR allegations. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact.

Applicant is a 55-year-old engineer employed by a federal contractor since June 2020. He worked for two other large companies from 1997 to June 2020 on commercial products. He has a security clearance. (GE 1; Tr. 11-16, 64, 81-88)

Applicant was born and raised in Israel. He performed mandatory service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from August 1988 to August 1991, as a communications technician, and attained the rank of sergeant. He earned a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from a university in the United Kingdom in 1997. (GE 1 at 14-15; Tr. 79-81)

Applicant married in Israel in December 1999. He and his spouse first entered the United States in 2000 and were naturalized in 2014. Both are citizens of Israel and the United States. They have three children, ages 25, 23, and 21. His oldest child acquired U.S. citizenship after his parents were naturalized. His younger children are U.S. citizens by birth. All three children are citizens of Israel. (GE 1 at 5-8, 16-24, GE 2; Tr. 64-68, 82-92, 123-24)

After graduating from college, Applicant worked for a multinational company in Israel. He accepted an offer from his employer for an 18-month position in the United States. He was later offered a permanent position in the United States. He wanted to accept the offer because he thought he could provide his wife and kids with a better life in the United States, including owning a home and being “away from … the chaos” identified in the Government’s Administrative Notice. (Tr. 84-85; HE III) However, Applicant’s wife wanted to return to Israel, so they did. After about six months, his wife agreed that their family could have a better life in the United States, so they decided to permanently relocate. He reached out to several groups within the company and received three job offers. His family has flourished in the United States, and he is grateful that they have been able to live the American dream. (GE 1 at 28-29, GE 2 at 4; Tr. 26, 36-37, 64-70, 82-89, 114-15)

Applicant has traveled to Israel four times since 2000. He canceled a planned trip in November 2023 after the Hamas attack in October 2023. (HE III) He last visited Israel in April 2018 and denied any intention to return permanently. He noted he only visits for a week at a time. His friends are in the United States except for some limited contact with friends in Israel from high school. He expressed his willingness to renounce his Israeli citizenship but believes he cannot travel to Israel unless he has his Israeli passport. He testified that no government or foreign contact had expressed any interest in his current work and stated that if any government or individual attempted to exploit, pressure or manipulate him or any family member, he would report it to his supervisor and security officer and challenge it in Israeli courts. He also declared his allegiance to the United States. (GE 1 at 32-33, GE 2 at 7-9; Tr. 41-42, 71-78, 88-112)

The evidence concerning the SOR allegations is set out below.

SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.c: Applicant’s mother, father, and sister are citizens and residents of Israel. Applicant’s parents were born in Israel and have lived in the same apartment for more than 50 years. His parents are retired and neither have or had any affiliation with Israel’s government, the IDF or the defense industry. His father, 85 years old at the time of the hearing, was a bus driver and his 79-year-old mother was a survey designer. He speaks to his father almost daily and has frequent but limited communication with his mother because of her dementia. His parents are financially independent. The only financial support they receive from the government of Israel is akin to U.S. social security retirement benefits. He receives no financial support from his parents and has not been asked to provide them with any financial support. He loves his parents and family, noted he has good memories of Israel, and stated “my time in Israel had passed.” (Tr. 77) He is dedicated to the United States, his job, and most of all to his kids’ futures. (Tr. 29-36, 63-64, 74-79, 92-94)

Applicant’s sister is a citizen and resident of Israel. She was 50 years old at the time of the hearing. She has a Ph.D. and is a lecturer at two public universities. They communicate every few weeks and primarily discuss their parents. She has no affiliation with Israel’s government, the IDF, or the defense industry. His parents and sister live in safe areas and have ready access to shelters from aerial attack. (Tr. 63-68, 76-79, 94-97)

SOR ¶ 1.d: Applicant’s mother-in-law is a citizen and resident of Israel. She is a retired attorney. She was 81 years old at the time of the hearing and lived in a safe area. She has no known affiliation with the government, the IDF, or the defense industry. His wife speaks to her almost daily and he often says hello and greets her on special occasions. (GE 1 at -26-28, GE 2 at 3-4; Tr. 30-36, 63-79, 97-100)

SOR ¶ 1.e: Applicant co-owns a house with his spouse in Israel with an approximate value of $262,000. Applicant and his wife purchased the apartment for about $250,000 in 1999.[1] They purchased the apartment with money he earned and with financial assistance from his in-laws. He estimated its current value at $500,000 or more. The apartment has been a rental property since they moved to the United States in 2000. He has no emotional attachment to the apartment but acknowledged that his wife "is a little bit more connected" to the property there, but "[he is] pretty sure she'll come around when we need to sell it." (Tr. 72) He believes that they will need to sell the apartment when their kids get married to assist them in purchasing property in the United States. He did not consider the apartment to be a significant investment in comparison to his U.S. financial interests of about $2.5 million. (GE 1 at 28-29, GE 2 at 4; Tr. 36-37, 42, 65-66, 71-72, 105-110, 124-25; AE BB)

Applicant submitted evidence that he received about $12,000 in rent in tax year (TY) 2022 and TY 2023 from the apartment in Israel. He also incurred expenses of about $11,000 in TY 2022 and of about $10,000 in TY 2023. (AE D at 2, AE at 2)

SOR ¶ 1.f: Applicant maintains a bank account in Israel with an approximate value of $90,000. Applicant admitted the allegation and submitted evidence that he filed annual reports required by the U.S. Department of Treasury for Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) in 2022 through 2024 for this bank account. (GE 2 at 4-5; AE A-D) In TY 2022 tax documents, he identified the maximum account value of this bank account as $110,000. (AE E, AE L)

In May 2022, Applicant told a government investigator the account balance was greater than $90,000, but he was unsure of the exact amount. The investigator confronted Applicant with evidence of account balances fluctuating from about $190,000 in calendar year (CY) 2013 to $270,000 in CY 2017 to $94,720 in CY 2018 to $113,000 in CY 2019 to $110,900 in CY 2020 to about $110,000 in TY 2023. (GE 2 at 4-5)

Applicant testified he and his wife deposit rental checks from their apartment in Israel into this bank account and they have used this account to pay some expenses. He denied transferring any funds from their U.S. accounts into this Israeli bank account or otherwise investing any funds in Israel in the past 25 years. He acknowledged the account balance fluctuated and stated they used funds from the account to cover large expenses in the United States when needed. He used funds from this Israeli bank account to help pay for his home in the United States and to pay school tuition for his kids and stated his intent to withdraw $15,000 to purchase a car his wife had been leasing. (GE 2 at 4-5; Tr. 72-75, 105-108, 126-130)

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[1] All values are expressed in U.S. Dollars (USD).

Applicant was informed of the importance of providing documentary evidence regarding the fluctuations in the value of his bank account in Israel and of his U.S. assets. He said his wife may have received funds from her mother, but he was unsure. (Tr. 110-130) After the hearing, he submitted the following:

> At this point I need to correct my statement that money is in a checking account … my wife managed the account with great care and invested the free cash in CDs from best returns. The account was left untouched for over 11 years with fixed income (rent) and interest. It shows an organic growth to $270K[.] There is one exception. In 2008 my grandmother passed and left me 200K nis [Israeli Shekel] ($57K [USD]) that was deposited into the account. (AE O)

Applicant submitted evidence of a savings account and a checking account in Israel. He submitted end of year account statements from 2007 through 2023. (AE Z) The account statements are primarily in Hebrew, however, Applicant translated and explained key portions of the statements and provided exchange rate summaries. (AE O, AE Y-Z) He submitted evidence of wire transfers from the Israeli accounts into his U.S. account totaling $258,690 from April 2018 to August 2023. The transfers included $9,970 (April 2018), $164,970 (August 2018), $14,970 (November 2020), $49,970 (January 2021), and $18,810 (August 2023). (AE O, AE Y, AE AA) He stated his summary of income from 2007 to 2023 is "key to answering [Department Counsel's] question how in 2017 the account had $270K." (AE O) He submitted a summary of account information from 2007 through 2023 that applied relevant exchange rates with explanatory graphs corresponding with account values shown in the account statements and the wire transfers to his U.S. account. (AE AA at 6) He also explained a deposit of about $57,000 into the account (an inheritance from his grandmother) and included a copy of her will and related documents. (AE O, AE CC)

Applicant's current annual salary is about $179,000. (Tr. 37-38) He estimated that he had $2.5 million in U.S. assets. (Tr.73-74, 108-111) After the hearing, he submitted evidence of U.S. assets totaling about $2,448,000. His bank accounts and various investment accounts in the United States total about $1,241,000, and his retirement accounts in the United States total about $300,000. (AE N, AE Q-T, AE V-X) He submitted evidence showing his U.S. home was valued at about $907,000, including about $680,000 in equity. (AE P, AE U)

Although not alleged in the SOR, Applicant's brother-in-law is also a citizen and resident of Israel. Applicant did not know how often his wife communicated with her brother, and Applicant's contact is limited to occasional greetings. His brother-in-law suffers from a neurological disease and does not work. (Tr. 99-101)

Applicant's father-in-law is a citizen of Israel, and a citizen and resident of Mexico. He is retired and lives off proceeds from a business he sold in Mexico. He helped pay for two vehicles for Applicant's children. In January 2021 a $250,000 wire transfer from him was deposited into a joint account belonging to Applicant and his wife. (GE 1 at 25-26; Tr. 29-32, 98-99; AE AA at 4)

Character Evidence

Applicant's manager and close friend has known him since June 2020. He quickly recognized Applicant's incredible skills as an engineer, unmatched ability to digest technical information and create timely solutions, mission focus, honesty and loyalty. He described Applicant as "incredibly trustworthy" in his professional and personal lives, and as dedicated to his family, friends, coworkers, company and to the United States. He attested to Applicant's, his wife's, and their children's "love of the life they have [in the United States]" and their deep appreciation for the opportunities to attain their goals. Applicant "respects the values of his upbringing but has shown me every indication that America is his home" and has put his "knowledge to work to ensure [his wife and kids] have a long future in the United States." Applicant has no intention to leave the U.S. and has unquestionable loyalty. The witness had held a security clearance for about 11 years including special accesses, supervises cleared personnel and recommends Applicant for a security clearance without reservation. (Tr. 22-53; AE J)

Applicant submitted favorable annual performance reviews from 2020 through 2023 that show he met or exceeded all expectations. His performance reviews commented favorably on his teamwork, technical proficiency, performance, trustworthiness, reliability, and on his significant contributions to his employer's mission and reputation. (AE F-I)

State of Israel and the Palestinian Territories

I have taken administrative notice that Israel is a multiparty parliamentary democracy. The State of Israel was established in 1948. Israel has become a regional economic and military powerhouse, leveraging its prosperous high-tech sector, large defense industry, and concerns about Iran to foster partnerships around the world. The United States has a long and supportive relationship with Israel. The U.S. has performed a key role in efforts to broker peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and continues its efforts to advance peace including recent normalization agreements with several regional nations.

The Gaza Strip has been under de facto governing authority of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), a U.S. designated foreign-terrorist organization, since 2007. The government of Israel occupies the West Bank and maintains a security presence through the Israeli Security Forces (ISF). The Palestinian Authority exercises varying degrees of authority in restricted areas of the West Bank due to the continuing presence of the ISF. Israel has a robust legal framework to combat terrorism and is a committed counterterrorism partner of the United States.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas militants inside Gaza launched an attack into Israel. They attacked military bases, clashed with security forces mostly in southern Israel, and simultaneously infiltrated civilian communities. During the attack, militants carried out massacres and murdered civilians, including torture, rape and abuse, and kidnapped approximately 240 persons. The following day, the Israeli prime minister formally declared war on Hamas and launched a large-scale ground assault inside Gaza that continues. On October 18, 2023, President Biden declared U.S. support for Israel. On March 25, 2024, Secretary of State Blinken reiterated U.S. support for ensuring the defeat of Hamas and underscored alternatives to a major ground offensive to better ensure Israel's security and protect Palestinian civilians. Israel remains focused on destroying Hamas and will likely face lingering armed resistance from Hamas for years to come.

The October 2023 Hamas attack and Israel's responding military campaign in Gaza has increased tensions throughout the region as Iranian proxies and partners conduct anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli attacks, both in support of Hamas and to pressure the United States. On January 3, 2024, the U.S. Department of State issued a travel advisory for Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, recommending that U.S. citizens not travel to Gaza due to terrorism and armed conflict and to reconsider travel to Israel and the West Bank due to terrorism and civil unrest.

Policies

"[N]o one has a 'right' to a security clearance." *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to "control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information." *Id.* at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information "only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so." Exec. Or. 10865 § 2.

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge's overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Clearance decisions must be made "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." Exec. Or. 10865

§ 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. *See Egan*, 484 U.S. at 531. "Substantial evidence" is "more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." *See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.*, 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant's security suitability. *See* ISCR Case No. 15-01253 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2016).

Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. *See* ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).

An applicant "has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance." ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). "[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials." *Egan*, 484 U.S. at 531.

Analysis

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6:

> Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual maybe manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

The following disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 7 are potentially applicable:

> (a) contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
>
> (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect classified or sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information or technology; and
>
> (f) substantial business, financial, or property interests in a foreign country, or in any foreign owned or foreign-operated business that could subject the individual to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation or personal conflict of interest.

Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. "The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States." ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). Nevertheless, the nature of a nation's government and its relationship with the United States are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant's family members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, or if a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government. An administrative judge must also consider any terrorist activity in the country at issue.

There is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, the immediate family members of their spouse. ISCR Case No. 10-09986 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 15, 2011). "[A]n applicant's ties of affections for his or her in-laws has less to do with the applicant's feelings towards that family but instead contemplates the bonds of affection that the applicant's spouse holds for his or her immediate family members, which is then imputed to the applicant as a result of the marital relationship. This is true even though an applicant has minimal or no direct contact with the relatives." ISCR Case No. 19-02096 at 7 (App. Bd. Feb. 29, 2024) (citation omitted).

AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(f) require substantial evidence of a "heightened risk." The "heightened risk" required to raise one of these disqualifying conditions is a relatively low standard. "Heightened risk" denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a foreign government. *See, e.g.*, ISCR Case No. 12-05839 at 4 (App. Bd. Jul. 11, 2013). The ongoing hostilities between Israel and a terrorist organization, and Applicant's relationship with his parents, sister, and mother-in-law, are sufficient to establish the requisite "heightened risk" and potential conflict of interest. Applicant's admissions and other record evidence establish AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(f).

The following conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns under AG ¶ 8 are potentially applicable:

> (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the United States;
>
> (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, or allegiance to the group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interests;
>
> (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk of foreign influence or exploitation; and
>
> (f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.

AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(b) are established. Israel is a friendly country. Applicant's parents, sister, and mother-in-law are not affiliated with the Israeli government, military or intelligence services, and a conflict of interest is unlikely. He has resided and worked exclusively in the United States since 2000. He has forged deep and longstanding personal and professional relationships in the United States and dedicated himself to his children's future in the United States. Applicant's deep and longstanding loyalties to his career, wife, children and to the United States are such that he can be expected to resolve any potential conflict of interest in favor of the United States.

AG ¶ 8(c) is not established. Applicant's contact and communication with his parents and sister, and his spouse's contact with his mother-in-law, which is imputed to him, are neither casual nor infrequent.

AG ¶ 8(f) is established. The value of Applicant's financial interests in Israel (about $600,00), are substantially less than his financial and property interests in the United States (about $2,500,000). Under these circumstances and considering the relationship between the U.S. and Israel his potential interests are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the Applicant.

Whole-Person Concept

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

> (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis and applied the adjudicative factors in AG ¶ 2(d). I have considered Applicant's age, education, work history, military history, and character evidence.

Applicant was candid, sincere, and credible at the hearing. His post-trial submissions satisfactorily addressed concerns about the fluctuations in value of his financial accounts in Israel. I am persuaded by Applicant's testimony, corroborated by other record evidence including his performance evaluations, financial records, and character evidence, that there is not a question as to his loyalty to the United States, his valuable contributions to a defense contractor, or his sincere intent to resolve any potential conflict of interest in favor of U.S. interests. It is clear from the evidence that he has dedicated himself to his family, his job, and the mission he supports.

After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant mitigated foreign influence security concerns.

Formal Findings

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B (Foreign Influence):	FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.f:	For Applicant

Conclusion

I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to continue Applicant's eligibility for access to classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Eric C. Price
Administrative Judge