

Guideline B (Foreign Influence) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). Applicant requested that the case be decided upon the written record. On February 28, 2007, after considering the record, Administrative Judge Juan J. Rivera denied Applicant's request for a security clearance. Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.

Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge's adverse clearance decision under Guidelines C and B is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.

Applicant argues that the Judge erred in concluding that he had not mitigated the security concerns raised under Guidelines C and B. In support of this argument, Applicant summarizes the favorable evidence he presented below. The Board does not find Applicant's argument persuasive.

The Applicant has not met his burden of demonstrating that the Judge erred in concluding that the security concerns raised by his possession and renewal of a Polish passport, and his family ties and property interests in Poland, had not been mitigated. Although Applicant strongly disagrees with the Judge's conclusions, he has not established that those conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. *See* Directive ¶ E3.1.32.3.

"[T]here is a strong presumption against granting a security clearance." *Dorfmont v. Brown*, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), *cert. denied*, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to establish mitigation. *See* Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The application of disqualifying and mitigating conditions does not turn simply on a finding that one or more of them apply to the particular facts of a case. Rather, their application requires the exercise of sound discretion in light of the record evidence as a whole. *See, e.g.*, ISCR Case No. 01-14740 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan.15, 2003). Thus, the presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision. As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or *vice versa*. An applicant's disagreement with the Judge's weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the nature and seriousness of the disqualifying circumstances, and considered the possible application of relevant mitigating conditions. The Judge reasonably explained why the evidence which the Applicant had presented in mitigation was insufficient to overcome the government's security concerns. The Board does not review a case *de novo*. The favorable record evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. *See, e.g.*, ISCR Case No. 02-28041 at 4 (App. Bd. Jun. 29, 2005). Given the record that was before him, the Judge's ultimate unfavorable clearance decision under Guidelines C and B is sustainable.

Order

The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a clearance is AFFIRMED.

Signed: Michael D. Hipple

Michael D. Hipple
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board

Signed: Jean E. Smallin

Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board

Signed: William S. Fields

William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board