

DATE: November 26, 2003

In Re:

SSN: -----

Applicant for Security Clearance

ISCR Case No. 01-23082

DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

ROBERT ROBINSON GALES

APPEARANCES

FOR GOVERNMENT

Erin C. Hogan, Esquire, Department Counsel

FOR APPLICANT

Pro Se

SYNOPSIS

Fifty-seven-year old Applicant's 1965 arrest for burglary and conspiracy, when he was 19-years old, and his subsequent conviction, upon his plea of guilty, led to a sentence of imprisonment for an indefinite term not to exceed 10 years. The absence of any subsequent criminal conduct would normally mitigate the government's security concerns. However, the application of 10 U.S.C. § 986 disqualifies him from eligibility. Clearance is denied. Further consideration of this case for a waiver of 10 U.S.C. § 986 is recommended.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 18, 2003, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to Executive Order 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry*, dated February 20, 1960, as amended and modified, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant, and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked.

In a sworn, written statement, dated August 27, 2003, Applicant responded to the allegations set forth in the SO, and elected to have his case decided on the written record, in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the government's written case on October 2, 2003. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) [\(1\)](#) was provided to Applicant, and he was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. On October 27, 2003, Applicant indicated he had nothing further to submit. The case was assigned to me on November 6, 2003.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant has admitted one of the factual allegations (subparagraph 1.a.) pertaining to criminal conduct under Guideline J. That admission is incorporated herein a finding of fact. He has denied the remaining allegation.

After a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due consideration of same, I make the following additional findings of fact:

Applicant is a 57-year-old employee of a defense contractor, and is seeking to obtain a security clearance, the level of which has not be indicated.

Applicant was involved in one criminal incident which occurred nearly 39 years ago. In January 1965, when he was an 18-year-old high school drop-out residing on the streets, Applicant broke into a camera store with some friends and stole an unspecified amount of money. As they exited the store, they were immediately arrested by the police who had been alerted to the break-in by a silent alarm.⁽²⁾ He was subsequently convicted of burglary and conspiracy, upon his plea of guilty, and sentenced to an indefinite term of incarceration not to exceed 10 years.⁽³⁾ During his period of incarceration, Applicant received vocational training.⁽⁴⁾ Applicant was released from the correctional facility in February 1965 and placed in a parole status until February 1975.⁽⁵⁾ He initially reported to his parole office on a weekly basis, but that frequency was eventually relaxed to a monthly basis.

Applicant's motivation for the burglary was to obtain money for basic needs to help him survive out on the streets. Alcohol and drugs played no part in his decision.⁽⁶⁾

Since his January 1965 arrest, Applicant has avoided any incidents with the authorities. He married in 1986.⁽⁷⁾ He has continued his technical education and has completed approximately 50% of the course work necessary for his BS degree.⁽⁸⁾

Applicant has been employed by the same company since November 1993. The quality of his performance has not been developed in the record.

POLICIES

Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines which must be considered in the evaluation of security suitability. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines are divided into those that may be considered in deciding whether to deny or revoke an individual's eligibility for access to classified information (Disqualifying Conditions) and those that may be considered in deciding whether to grant an individual's eligibility for access to classified information (Mitigating Conditions).

An Administrative Judge need not view the adjudicative guidelines as inflexible ironclad rules of law. Instead, acknowledging the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines, when applied in conjunction with the factors set forth in the Adjudicative Process provision in Section E2.2., Enclosure 2, of the Directive, are intended to assist the Administrative Judge in reaching fair and impartial common sense decisions.

Because the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the "whole person concept," all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in making a meaningful decision. The Adjudicative Process factors which an Administrative Judge should consider are: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at

the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Based upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole, I find the following adjudicative guideline most pertinent to an evaluation of the facts of this case:

Criminal Conduct - Guideline J: A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those which could mitigate security concerns, pertaining to this adjudicative guideline are set forth and discussed in the Conclusions section below.

On June 7, 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a Memorandum, *Implementation of Restrictions on the Granting or Renewal of Security Clearances as Mandated by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001*. The memorandum provides policy guidance for the implementation of Section 1071 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which amended Title 10, United States Code, to add a new section (10 U.S.C. § 986) that precludes the initial granting or renewal of a security clearance by the Department of Defense under specific circumstances. The situation described above involves one of those specific circumstances.

The statutory mandate applies to any DoD officer or employee, officer, director, or employee of a DoD contractor, or member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps on active duty or in an active status, who is under consideration for the issuance or continuation of eligibility for access to classified information and who falls under one or more of the following provisions of the statute:

- (1) has been convicted in any court of the United States of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
- (2) is an unlawful user of, or is addicted to, a controlled substance (as defined in Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802));
- (3) is mentally incompetent, as determined by a mental health professional approved by the Department of Defense; or
- (4) has been discharged or dismissed from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions.

The statute also "provides that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Military Departments concerned may authorize a waiver of the prohibitions concerning convictions, dismissals and dishonorable discharges from the armed forces in meritorious cases."

Implementing guidance attached to the memorandum indicates that provision 1, described above, "disqualifies persons with convictions in both State and Federal courts, including UCMJ offenses, with sentences imposed of *more than* one year, regardless of the amount of time actually served."

Since the protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, the final decision in each case must be arrived at by applying the standard the issuance of the clearance is "clearly consistent with the interests of national security,"⁽⁹⁾ or "clearly consistent with the national interest." For the purposes herein, despite the different language in each, I have concluded both standards are one and the same. In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.

In the decision-making process, the burden of producing evidence initially falls on the Government to establish a case which demonstrates, in accordance with the Directive, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue an applicant's access to classified information. If the Government meets its burden, the heavy burden of persuasion then falls upon the applicant to present evidence in refutation, explanation, extenuation or mitigation sufficient to overcome the doubts raised by the Government's case, and to ultimately demonstrate it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue the applicant's clearance.

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. It is a relationship that transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. It is because of this special relationship the Government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions under this Directive include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

One additional comment is worthy of note. Applicant's allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism are not at issue in these proceedings. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically provides industrial security clearance decisions shall be "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." Security clearance decisions cover many characteristics of an applicant other than allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism. Nothing in this Decision should be construed to suggest I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied decision as to Applicant's allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism.

CONCLUSIONS

Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal precepts, factors, and conditions, including those described briefly above, I conclude the following with respect to the allegation set forth in the SOR:

With respect to Guideline J, the government has established its case. By his own admission, Applicant was involved in a burglary and conspiracy that resulted in his arrest at the scene. Upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced to an indefinite term of incarceration not to exceed 10 years. Applicant's criminal conduct clearly falls within Criminal Conduct Disqualifying Condition (DC) E2.A10.1.2.1. (*allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged*), DC E2.A10.1.2.2. (*a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses*), and DC E2.A10.1.2.3. (*conviction in a Federal or State court, including a court-martial of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year*).

It has been approximately 39 years since the criminal conduct of January 1965. Since then, Applicant has not been involved in any additional criminal conduct and has apparently turned his life around. Those facts would seem to activate Criminal Conduct Mitigating Condition (MC) E2.A10.1.3.1. (*the criminal behavior was not recent*). Moreover, by virtue of his spotless record since the arrest, there is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation, thus activating MC E2.A10.1.3.6. (*there is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation*). In addition, since this criminal conduct was not preceded or succeeded by any other similar conduct, MC E2.A10.1.3.2. (*the crime was an isolated incident*).

A person should not be held forever accountable for misconduct from the past, especially the indiscretions of his early adulthood, when there is a clear indication of subsequent reform, remorse, or rehabilitation. Under other circumstances, I might conclude Applicant had, through evidence of extenuation and explanation, successfully mitigated and overcome the Government's case, and the allegation of the SOR would be concluded in favor of Applicant.

However, Applicant's criminal conduct also falls within 10 U.S.C. § 986. He was convicted in a state court of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment for an indefinite term not to exceed 10 years--a term which obviously exceeds the one year period envisioned in the law. Furthermore, as noted above, the implementing guidance attached to the memorandum indicates such a sentence would disqualify persons with "sentences imposed of *more than* one year, regardless of the amount of time actually served. In this instance, Applicant was fortunate enough to have his prison term reduced rather than actually served, but that fact does not help him in this issue. Consequently, by virtue of 10 U.S.C. § 986, I conclude Applicant is not eligible for a security clearance. Accordingly, allegations 1.a. and 1.b. of the SOR, are concluded against Applicant.

In this instance, I recommend further consideration of this case for a waiver of 10 U.S.C. § 986.

For the reasons stated, I conclude Applicant is not eligible for access to classified information.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1. Guideline J: AGAINST THE APPLICANT

Subparagraph 1.a.: Against the Applicant

Subparagraph 1.b.: Against the Applicant

DECISION

In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. However, I recommend further consideration of this case for a waiver of 10 U.S.C. § 986.

Robert Robinson Gales
Chief Administrative Judge

1. The government submitted eight items in support of its contentions.
2. Item 6 (Statement of Subject, dated March 28, 2003), at 2.
3. *Id.*; Item 7 (Police Record, duplicated August 8, 2003).
4. Item 6, *supra* note 2, at 3.
5. *Id.*; Item 7, *supra* note 3.
6. *Id.*
7. Item 5 (Security Clearance Application (SF 86), dated September 7, 2000), at 2.
8. *Id.*, at 1
9. Exec. Or. 12968, "*Access to Classified Information*;" as implemented by Department of Defense Regulation 5200.2-R, "*Personnel Security Program*," dated January 1987, as amended by Change 3, dated November 8, 1995, and further modified by memorandum, dated November 10, 1998. However, the Directive, as amended by Change 4, dated April 20, 1999, uses both "clearly consistent with the national interest" (Sec. 2.3.; Sec.2.5.3.; Sec. 3.2.; and Sec. 4.2.; Enclosure 3, Sec. E3.1.1.; Sec. E3.1.2.; Sec. E3.1.25.; Sec. E3.1.26.; and Sec. E3.1.27.), and "clearly consistent with the interests of national security" (Enclosure 2, Sec. E2.2.3.); and "clearly consistent with national security" (Enclosure 2, Sec. E2.2.2.)