KEYWORD: Criminal Conduct, Financial

DIGEST: Applicant is a 38-year-old male, working as an antenna design engineer for a federal defense contractor since 1997. He was arrested twice. The first charge, for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in April 2000, was dismissed. His October 2001 arrest for driving while intoxicated resulted in a conviction and included supervised probation, community service, and payment of a fine. He has been alcohol free since 2001. Applicant has over 10 delinquent debts totaling approximately \$22,788. He offered no evidence in support of his contention that some of these debts were consolidated and being paid off. He has not mitigated the criminal conduct or financial considerations security concerns. Clearance is denied.

CASENO: 03-22679.h1

DATE: 02/17/2006

In re:
------SSN: -----

Applicant for Security Clearance

DATE: February 17, 2006

ISCR Case No. 03-22679

JACQUELINE T. WILLIAMS

APPEARANCES

FOR GOVERNMENT

Robert E. Coacher, Esq., Department Counsel

FOR APPLICANT

Pro Se

SYNOPSIS


Applicant is a 38-year-old male, working as an antenna design engineer for a federal defense contractor since 1997. He was arrested twice. The first charge, for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in April 2000, was dismissed. His October 2001 arrest for driving while intoxicated resulted in a conviction and included supervised probation, community service, and payment of a fine. He has been alcohol free since 2001. Applicant has over 10 delinquent debts totaling approximately \$22,788. He offered no evidence in support of his contention that some of these debts were consolidated and being paid off. He has not mitigated the criminal conduct or financial considerations security concerns. Clearance is denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant under Executive Order 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry* (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (Jan. 2, 1992), as amended and modified (the Directive). On January 10, 2005, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its decision: criminal conduct under Guideline J and financial considerations under Guideline F. Applicant answered the SOR on March 28, 2005 and requested a decision without a hearing.

Department counsel submitted the government's written case on July 15, 2005. Department Counsel provided a complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) to Applicant, along with notice of his opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the allegations. Applicant received the FORM on May 3, 2005. He did not respond to the FORM by the due date. On July 15, 2005, Department counsel submitted Applicant's response to the FORM. The government did not object to this document being submitted out of time. The case was assigned to me on June 15, 2005.

FINDINGS OF FACT



POLICIES

Each security clearance decision must be a fair and impartial commonsense decision based on the relevant and material facts and circumstances, and the whole-person concept, along with the factors listed in the Directive. Specifically, these are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding circumstances; (2) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (3) the age of the applicant; (4) the motivation of the applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with knowledge of the consequences; (5) the absence or presence of rehabilitation, and (6) the probability that the circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future. (9) Although the presence or absence of a particular condition or factor for or against clearance is not outcome determinative, the adjudicative guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against this policy guidance.

The sole purpose of a security clearance decision is to decide if it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an applicant. (10) The government has the burden of proving controverted facts. (11) The burden of proof in a security clearance case is less than a preponderance of the evidence. (12) Once the government has met its burden, the burden shifts to an applicant to present evidence of refutation, extenuation, or mitigation sufficient to overcome the case against him. (13) Additionally, an applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance decision. (14)

No one has a right to a security clearance (15) and "the clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials." (16) Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive information. (17) The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant. (18) It is merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Based upon consideration of all the evidence, I find the following adjudicative guidelines most pertinent to the evaluation of the facts in this case:


Guideline J - Criminal Conduct: a security concern exists when a person has a history or pattern of criminal activity which creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness.

Guideline F - Financial Considerations: a security concern exists when a person has significant delinquent debts. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.

| Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those which would mitigate security concerns pertaining to the idjudicative guidelines, are set forth and discussed in the conclusions below. |
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| <u>CONCLUSIONS</u> |
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| Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal precepts, factors and conditions, including those lescribed briefly above, I conclude the following with respect to each allegation set forth in the SOR. |
| Criminal Conduct |
| |
| Based on all the evidence as a whole, Criminal Conduct Disqualifying Condition (CC DC) E2.A10.1.2.1 (allegations or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged) and CC DC E2.A10.1.2.2 (a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses), both apply in this case. Applicant has committed two serious offenses. Based on E2.A10.1.2,1 I find that he was convicted of two offenses, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and DWI. The mere fact that the aggravated assault charge was dismissed, does not mean that he did not commit a neinous crime. Moreover, he admitted committing both offenses. I conclude that E2.A10.1.2.1 applies. Similarly, one allegation was a felony, while the other was a DWI. A felony is a serious crime as is a DWI. Thus, I conclude that CC DC E2.A10.1.2.2 also applies. |
| |
| considered all the Criminal Conduct Mitigating Conditions (CC MC) and specifically considered FC MC E2.A10.1.3.1 (the criminal behavior was not recent), CC MC E2.A10.1.3.4 (the person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that's person's life), and CC C E2.A10.1.3.6 (there is a clear evidence of successful rehabilitation). The aggravated assault charge occurred in 2000 and was dismissed because of lack of prosecution and supporting evidence; that fact that it was dismissed cannot be used in mitigation under the Directive. Thus, I find that this incident was not recent and since 2000 there is no evidence in the record of any other assault charges. Similarly, the DWI charge occurred in 2001, almost four years ago. Not only is he on supervised probation, he has been sober-free since that incident in 2001. I conclude that FC MC E2.A10.1.3.1 applies here. Since there have not been any other assault charges and since Applicant has been sober-free for more than four years, I conclude that FC MC E2.A10.1.3.4 and FC MC E2.A10.1.3.6 apply here. |
| Financial Considerations |
| |
| The security concern arising from financial difficulties is that "an individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds." The Directive sets out several potentially disqualifying conditions under this guideline. Financial Considerations Disqualifying Condition (FC DC) E2.A6.1.2.1 arises where there is a "history of not meeting financial obligations." Similarly, FC DC E2.A6.1.2.3 applies where the information shows an "inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts," Applicant has a history of not meeting his financial obligations. He was delinquent on several debts, which continues to date. He did not provide credible proof that some of his bills were consolidated and being |

paid off. I conclude FC DC E2.A6.1.2.1 and FC DC E2.A6.1.2.3 apply.





- 9. Directive, Enclosure 2, ¶ E2.2.1.
- 10. ISCR Case No. 96-0277 (July 11, 1997) at 2.
- 11. ISCR Case No. 97-0016 (December 31, 1997) at 3; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.14.
- 12. Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).
- 13. ISCR Case No. 94-1075 (August 10, 1995) at 3-4; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.
- 14. ISCR Case No. 93-1390 (January 27, 1995) at 7-8; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.
- 15. *Egan*, *supra* note 9, at 531.
- 16. *Id*.
- 17. *Id.*; Directive, Enclosure 2, ¶ E2.2.2.
- 18. Executive Order 10865 § 7.