

DATE: February 6, 1998

In Re:

SSN: -----

Applicant for Security Clearance

ISCR Case No. 97-0451

DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

ROBERT R. GALES

APPEARANCES

FOR GOVERNMENT

William S. Fields, Esquire, Department Counsel

FOR APPLICANT

Pro Se

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 24, 1997, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to Executive Order 10865, "Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry," dated February 20, 1960, as amended and modified, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, "Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program" (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant, and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked.

In a sworn written statement, dated October 21, 1997, Applicant responded to the allegations set forth in the SOR, and elected to have his case decided on a written record, in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the Government's written case on October 28, 1997. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM)⁽¹⁾ was provided to Applicant, and he was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. He apparently chose not to do so. The case was initially assigned to Administrative Judge Kathryn Moen Braeman on January 2, 1998, but due to caseload considerations, was subsequently reassigned to, and received by, this Administrative Judge on February 4, 1998.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant has admitted all but one of the factual allegations pertaining to drug involvement under Criterion H. Those admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact.

After a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due consideration of same, I make the following additional findings of fact:

Applicant is a twenty-three year old male employed by a defense contractor, and he is seeking to obtain a security

clearance.

Applicant is a poly-substance abuser whose choice of illegal substances has been primarily marijuana and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), but who has also used psilocybin mushrooms and hashish. He commenced using marijuana in about 1992, shortly after graduating from high school, and continued doing so, on a regular oftentimes daily basis, until at least May 1997.⁽²⁾ He normally smoked marijuana in a pipe or "bong," and rarely did so in cigarette form.

Applicant's position regarding his past and future use of marijuana is significant. He smoked it because he liked the euphoric feeling it gave him, and he considers it to be less harmful than alcohol.⁽³⁾ Although he eventually denied any intention to continue to use marijuana in the future,⁽⁴⁾ he had previously stated:⁽⁵⁾

I anticipate that I will continue using marijuana at approximately the same frequency in the future. However, if it is necessary for me to cease using marijuana in order to obtain a security clearance, I would be willing to stop using marijuana during the period of time that I needed a clearance.

On about 20 occasions during the period from about November 1995 to at least March 1996, Applicant also used LSD.⁽⁶⁾ Additionally, on two occasions in October 1995, Applicant experimented with psilocybin mushrooms.⁽⁷⁾ Furthermore, on at least two occasions since 1992, Applicant used hashish.⁽⁸⁾ He has vowed to never use LSD, psilocybin mushrooms, or hashish again in the future.⁽⁹⁾

During his period of substance abuse, Applicant periodically purchased varying quantities of marijuana, spending an average of between \$100 and \$200 per month; as well as an unspecified quantity of LSD, spending between \$1 and \$2 per "hit."⁽¹⁰⁾

Applicant has never undergone any drug treatment or rehabilitation.

Applicant has been employed by his current employer since mid-1996. The quality of his performance has not been characterized.

POLICIES

Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines which must be considered in the evaluation of security suitability. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines are divided into those that may be considered in deciding whether to deny or revoke an individual's eligibility for access to classified information (Disqualifying Factors) and those that may be considered in deciding whether to grant an individual's eligibility for access to classified information (Mitigating Factors).

An Administrative Judge need not view the adjudicative guidelines as inflexible ironclad rules of law. Instead, acknowledging the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines, when applied in conjunction with the factors set forth in the Adjudicative Process provision--an expansion of the factors set forth in Section F.3. of the Directive, are intended to assist the Administrative Judge in reaching fair and impartial common sense decisions.

Because the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the "whole person concept," all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in making a meaningful decision. The Adjudicative Process factors which an Administrative Judge should consider are: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Based upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole, I find the following adjudicative guidelines most pertinent to an evaluation of the facts of this case:

[Drug Involvement - Criterion H]: Improper or illegal involvement with drugs, raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering:

- (a) drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens) and
- (b) inhalants and other similar substances.

Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- (1) any drug abuse (see above definition);
- (2) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- (3) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future.

Since the protection of the national security is the paramount determinant, the final decision in each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that the issuance of the clearance is "clearly consistent with the interests of national security,"⁽¹¹⁾ or "clearly consistent with the national interest." For the purposes herein, despite the different language in each, I have concluded that both standards are one and the same. In reaching this Decision, I have endeavored to draw only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have attempted to avoid drawing inferences that are grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.

In the decision-making process, the burden of producing evidence initially falls on the Government to establish a case which demonstrates, in accordance with the Directive, that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue an applicant's access to classified information. If the Government meets its burden, the heavy burden of persuasion then falls upon the applicant to present evidence in refutation, explanation, extenuation or mitigation sufficient to overcome the doubts raised by the Government's case, and to ultimately demonstrate that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue the applicant's clearance.

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. It is a relationship that transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. It is because of this special relationship that the Government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions under this Directive include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

One additional comment is worthy of note. Applicant's loyalty and patriotism are not at issue in these proceedings. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that industrial security clearance decisions shall be "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." Security clearance decisions cover many characteristics of an applicant other than loyalty and patriotism. Nothing in this Decision should be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied decision as to Applicant's loyalty or patriotism.

CONCLUSIONS

Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, an assessment of the witness credibility, and after application of all

appropriate legal precepts and factors, including those described briefly above, I conclude the following with respect to each allegation set forth in the SOR:

With respect to Criterion H, the Government has established its case. Applicant's improper and illegal drug abuse, including the purchase, possession, and use of marijuana and LSD; and the possession and use of psilocybin mushrooms and hashish, is of concern, especially in light of his desire to have access to the nation's secrets. Applicant did not simply experiment, as a teenager, out of curiosity and stop. Instead, motivated by social pleasures, notwithstanding the legal status of his endeavor, he exhibited a pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, and immature behavior, and continued his substance abuse of marijuana, sometimes on a daily basis, for at least five years; and his abuse of LSD, on about 20 occasions, during a four month period in November 1995-March 1996. Compared with such substance abuse, his experimental abuse of psilocybin mushrooms and hashish is relatively insignificant.

The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes are significant factors in the overall adjudicative process. Despite a period of poly-substance abuse, Applicant has not undergone any drug awareness, education, or treatment program, in order to achieve a better self-understanding of the behavioral and psychological effects of his actions and the motivation therefor. Likewise, simply superficially claiming that continued enjoyment and social pleasures were motivators, does not demonstrate true insight into the actual motivation for following the course of conduct which he had chosen. Furthermore, it is unclear if Applicant has even abstained from further marijuana abuse since May 1997, since his declared intention at that time was to do so only if it was necessary for him to obtain a security clearance, and then he would abstain only during the period of time that he needed the clearance. Without an answer to this important question, as well as the development of countermeasures to the continuation or resumption of substance abuse--relapse prevention, the likelihood of recurrence becomes greater.

In this instance, especially in light of Applicant's changing commentary regarding future intentions, I believe that both the successful completion of a drug treatment and rehabilitation program, as well as confirmed abstinence for a reasonable period should be required to demonstrate the truly successful transformation from substance abuser to an abstinent, drug-free person, and to provide the basis for a conclusion that such conduct will not continue or recur in the future. Under the evidence presented, I possess little confidence that Applicant's substance abuse is a thing of the past, or that it will not recur.

I do not take this position lightly, but based on the law, as set forth in *Department of Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), my evaluation of the evidence, and my application of the pertinent factors under the Adjudicative Process, I believe that Applicant has failed to mitigate or overcome the Government's case. The evidence leaves me with grave questions and doubts as to Applicant's continued security eligibility and suitability. Accordingly, allegations 1.a. through 1.g. of the SOR are concluded against Applicant.

For the reasons stated, I conclude Applicant is not suitable for access to classified information.

FORMAL FINDINGS

Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1. Criterion H: AGAINST THE APPLICANT

Subparagraph 1.a.: Against the Applicant

Subparagraph 1.b.: Against the Applicant

Subparagraph 1.c.: Against the Applicant

Subparagraph 1.d.: Against the Applicant

Subparagraph 1.e.: Against the Applicant

Subparagraph 1.f.: Against the Applicant

Subparagraph 1.g.: Against the Applicant

DECISION

In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.

Robert R. Gales

Chief Administrative Judge

1. The Government submitted five items in support of its contentions.
2. *See* Item 4 (Questionnaire For National Security Positions, dated December 12, 1996) at 8; and Item 5 (Statement of Subject, dated May 27, 1997).
3. *See* Item 5.
4. *See* Item 3 (Applicant's Response to Statement of Reasons, dated October 21, 1997).
5. *See* Item 5, *supra* note 2.
6. *See* Item 4, *supra* note 2, at 8; and Item 5, *supra* note 2.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *See* Item 5, *supra* note 2.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *See*, Executive Order 12968, "*Access to Classified Information*;" as implemented by Department of Defense Regulation 5200.2-R, "*Personnel Security Program*," dated January 1987, as amended by Change 3, dated November 8, 1995. However, the Directive uses both "clearly consistent with the national interest" (*see*, Sec. B.3; Sec. C.2.; and Sec. D.2.; Enclosure 3, Sec. 1.; and Sec. 25), and "clearly consistent with the interests of national security" (*see*, Enclosure 2 (Change 3), Adjudicative Guidelines, at 2-2).