

KEYWORD: Guideline F

DIGEST: Applicant still has significant outstanding debt and is still trying to resolve his financial problems. The Judge could reasonably conclude his problems were ongoing. Adverse decision affirmed.

CASENO: 08-04889.a1

DATE: 04/23/2009

DATE: April 23, 2009

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In Re:	)	
	)	
-----	)	ISCR Case No. 08-04889
	)	
Applicant for Security Clearance	)	
_____	)	

**APPEAL BOARD DECISION**

**APPEARANCES**

**FOR GOVERNMENT**

James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel

**FOR APPLICANT**

*Pro Se*

The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance. On October 3, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive). Applicant requested a hearing. On February 19, 2009, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Shari Dam denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance. Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.

Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge considered the totality of his financial problems dating from the late 1990s in reaching her decision. It is Applicant’s contention that his earlier financial problems were unrelated to his current financial problems. In the alternative, Applicant asks that he be granted a clearance so that he can have time to work out a plan to pay off his outstanding debts. Applicant has not demonstrated that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to establish mitigation. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision. As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or *vice versa*. *See, e.g.*, ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007). A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. *See, e.g.*, ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).

In this case, the Judge found that Applicant had a lengthy history of not meeting financial obligations. At the time the case was submitted for decision, Applicant still had significant outstanding debts, and was still trying to resolve his financial problems. In light of the foregoing, the Judge could reasonably conclude that those problems were still ongoing. *See, e.g.*, ISCR Case No. 05-07747 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2007). The Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the length and seriousness of the disqualifying conduct, considered the possible application of relevant conditions and factors, and reasonably explained why the mitigating evidence was insufficient to overcome the government’s security concerns. The Board does not review a case *de novo*. Nor does it have authority to grant a clearance on a conditional or probationary basis. *See, e.g.*, ISCR Case No. 08-03258 at 2 (App. Bd. Mar. 9, 2009).

After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting *Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States*, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when

‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). Therefore, the Judge’s unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.

**Order**

The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.

Signed: Michael D. Hipple  
Michael D. Hipple  
Administrative Judge  
Member, Appeal Board

Signed: Jean E. Smallin  
Jean E. Smallin  
Administrative Judge  
Member, Appeal Board

Signed: William S. Fields  
William S. Fields  
Administrative Judge  
Member, Appeal Board