



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**



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| In the matter of: |) | |
| |) | |
| ----- |) | ISCR Case No. 08-06471 |
| SSN: ----- |) | |
| |) | |
| Applicant for Security Clearance |) | |

Appearances

For Government: John B. Glendon, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Greg D. McCormack, Esq.

December 7, 2009

Decision

FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge:

This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) arising from Applicant’s family and personal ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Statement of the Case

Applicant submitted a security clearance application on March 11, 2008. On September 18, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) sent her a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny her application, citing security concerns under Guideline B. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005.

Applicant answered the SOR on October 18, 2008, and requested a determination on the record without a hearing. On January 26, 2009, she requested a hearing before an administrative judge (Hearing Exhibit (HX) II). (HX I is discussed below.) Department Counsel was ready to proceed on June 18, 2009, and the case was assigned to an administrative judge on June 19, 2009. The case was reassigned to me on July 31, 2009, based on workload. The case was tentatively scheduled for September 3, 2009, but was postponed due to the unavailability of Applicant's counsel. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on September 2, 2009, scheduling the hearing for September 23, 2009. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 and 2 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant's Exhibits (AX) A through F, which were admitted without objection. I kept the record open until October 2, 2009, to enable Applicant to submit additional documentary evidence. She timely submitted AX G and H. Department Counsel's comments regarding AX G and H are attached to the record as HX III. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on October 1, 2009. The record closed on October 2, 2009.

Administrative Notice

I granted Department Counsel's request to take administrative notice of relevant facts about the PRC. The request and its enclosures were not admitted in evidence but are attached to the record as HX I. The facts administratively noticed are set out below in my findings of fact.

Findings of Fact

In her answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.c and 1.i, and offered explanations. Her admissions in her answer and at the hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact.

Applicant is a 52-year-old senior system analyst employed by a federal contractor. She has worked for her current employer since March 2007. She previously worked for other federal contractors from February 1998 to April 1999 and from June 2004 to February 2007. She previously received a favorable trustworthiness determination in June 2004 (GX 1 at 27; Tr. 80), but she has never held a security clearance (Tr. 6).

Applicant was born in the PRC. When she was one year old, her parents were sent to separate labor camps. Applicant lived with her mother in a labor camp for about four years (Tr. 32-33).

Applicant obtained her undergraduate college degree in the PRC and then worked in the textile industry (Tr. 64). She was married in May 1982. She and her husband were involved in the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989 (Tr. 45). They came to the U.S. in 1990. They left the PRC primarily because of their experience at Tiananmen Square. Applicant's husband entered the U.S. on a student visa, and she followed him as a visiting family member (Tr. 63). She attended a U.S. university from

May 1992 to May 1995 and obtained two master's degrees, one in physics and one in engineering (Tr. 48-49).

Applicant became a U.S. citizen in December 2003 (AX A-1). She obtained a U.S. passport in July 2005 (AX G). She did not use her PRC passport after becoming a U.S. citizen (Tr. 48). Her husband became a U.S. citizen in July 2007, and he is employed by a defense contractor (Tr. 50). They have a 25-year-old daughter who attends medical school in the U.S. and is engaged to marry a U.S. citizen (Tr. 78).

Applicant's mother-in-law is deceased, and her father-in-law has been a permanent resident of the U.S. since January 2009 (Tr. 63; AX A-2). Her husband's brother is a citizen and resident of Canada (Tr. 43).

Applicant traveled to the PRC to visit her parents in 2001, before she became a U.S. citizen. She traveled to the PRC again for 16 days in June 2006 with a tour arranged by a U.S. travel agency (GX 1 at 22; AX G at 6; Tr. 79). She stayed in a hotel with the tour group, even though her parents were still living in the PRC, because she was working for a defense contractor and she wanted to avoid having to register with the local police (Tr. 79-80). She filed the required trip reports with her employer (Tr. 81).

When Applicant applied for a visa to visit the PRC, the PRC embassy requested that she produce her PRC passport, which had expired on January 6, 2005. The PRC embassy cancelled her passport and placed a visa stamp on her U.S. passport (AX H; Tr. 70).

Applicant's parents came to the U.S. in October 2007 and became permanent residents of the U.S. (Answer at 1; AX A-3; AX A-4). They returned to the PRC in 2008 because her mother had osteoporosis, had not lived in the U.S. long enough to qualify for Medicare, and could not afford the medicine and treatment she needed. The medicine and treatment were affordable in the PRC. While in the PRC, they helped her father-in-law apply for permanent residence in the U.S. (Tr. 36, 76). They returned to the U.S. in January 2009, and her father-in-law came with them (Tr. 37).

Before coming to the U.S., Applicant's father had a clerical job with a construction company. Her mother was a bookkeeper with the same company. Neither parent was associated with the PRC government or the military (Tr. 61-62). Applicant's father-in-law was a retired teacher before coming to the U.S. Her mother-in-law was a school nurse before she died (Tr. 63). Her father, mother, and father-in-law receive small pensions from the PRC, each receiving about \$200 a month (Tr. 85).

Applicant denied having contact once a year with a friend in the PRC, as alleged in SOR ¶ 1.h. She testified that she previously maintained once-a-year contact with a neighbor who had cared for her daughter, but she stopped contacting her three or four years ago because her security training made her aware of the risks involved in maintaining contact with a citizen and resident of the PRC (Tr. 82-83).

Applicant's younger sister is the only member of her immediate family residing in the PRC. In 2000 or 2001, her sister was imprisoned for one year because of her religious beliefs (Tr. 35). Applicant sponsored her sister for an immigrant visa in April 2004 (AX A-5). In September 2009, Applicant's sister was notified by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services that her application was still being processed (AX A-6). Her sister is an engineer employed by an information technology company in the PRC that is engaged in a joint venture with a U.S. company (AX A-7; Tr. 84).

Applicant's sister lived with her grandmother as a young child (Tr. 87). Because Applicant and her sister spent most of their lives apart, they never became close (Tr. 87-89). After Applicant came to the U.S., she did not talk to her sister for about ten years (Tr. 89). At the time of the hearing, it had been a "few months" since their last contact, and the call was initiated by her father to update her sister on the status of her visa request (Tr. 83-84). Applicant has not told her sister anything about her job (Tr. 86).

Applicant and her husband purchased a home in the U.S. in 2002 (Tr. 30). They paid off the mortgage on the home in September 2009 (AX B-1). She lives in the home with her husband, her parents, and her father-in-law (Tr. 30-31). Applicant and her husband have fully paid for their three cars (Tr. 53). They have more than \$270,000 in bank accounts, retirement accounts, and investments (AX B-2 through B-9). They have no financial interests in the PRC (Tr. 53).

Applicant is highly regarded by her employer and has received numerous certificates recognizing her contributions to the company (AX D-2 through D-5). She has completed several courses to enhance her managerial skills and security awareness (AX E-1 through E-11).

A former supervisor who has known Applicant for more than eight years considers her capable, dedicated, and a person of exceptional character (AX F-1). Another supervisor for whom Applicant worked for four years describes her as one who "always went the extra mile" to carry out her responsibilities (AX F-2). A coworker who has become a personal friend describes her as a "model employee" with exceptional technical and organizational skills, an informal mentor for other employees, and very dependable (AX F-3). A former coworker for five years attended her hearing to provide moral support and submitted a statement attesting to her trustworthiness and loyalty to the U.S. (AX F-4). Another former coworker commented on her thoughtfulness toward others and her dedication (AX F-5). Two other coworkers were impressed with her dedication, technical knowledge, strong character, and reaction to adversity and difficulty (AX F6 and F-8). A former college classmate who is now a family friend considers Applicant very trustworthy, focused, and committed to excellence. Her classmate noted that Applicant is usually very reserved, but she is strong when confronted with adversity (AX F-7).

Applicant testified she has no loyalty to the PRC and that she is "one hundred percent loyal to the United States." Her experience with PRC repression has made an indelible impression on her. She testified, "I consider the United States my country, and

if my country is not safe, my home is not safe.” She concluded her testimony by expressing her gratitude to the U.S, referring to it as “the safest place in the world,” and vowing to bring all of her family to the U.S. (Tr. 54-55, 89).

I have taken administrative notice of the following facts. The PRC is a large and economically powerful country, with a population of over a billion people and an economy growing at about ten percent per year. It has an authoritarian government dominated by the Communist Party. It has large and increasingly sophisticated military forces. The U.S. and the PRC have been rivals since the Cold War, with particular disagreement on the status of Taiwan. Despite political disagreements, the U.S. and the PRC have become major economic and trading partners, and have cooperated on law enforcement matters, threats posed by the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran, and transnational health threats.

I have also taken administrative notice that the PRC aggressively targets sensitive and protected U.S. technology and military information, using worldwide intelligence operations. It exerts pressure on foreign companies, including those in the U.S., to transfer technology to companies in the PRC as part of doing business in the PRC. It is one of the most aggressive practitioners of industrial espionage in the world. U.S. citizens of PRC ancestry are considered prime intelligence targets.

Finally, I have taken administrative notice that the PRC has a poor human rights record. It suppresses political dissent, and it practices arbitrary arrest and detention, forced confessions, torture, and mistreatment of prisoners. Travelers to the PRC can expect to be placed under surveillance, with their hotel rooms, telephones, and fax machines monitored and personal possessions, including computers, searched without their knowledge or consent. Because the PRC does not recognize dual citizenship, it may not afford naturalized U.S. citizens of PRC ancestry the consular protections to which they are entitled.

Policies

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” *Id.* at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and

commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.

The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See *Egan*, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See *v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.*, 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).

Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” *Egan*, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).

Analysis

Guideline B, Foreign Influence

The SOR alleges Applicant’s parents, sister, father-in-law, and brother-in-law are citizens and residents of the PRC (SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, 1.d, and 1.e); her spouse is a citizen of the PRC residing in the U.S. (SOR ¶ 1.b); she has contact with family members in the PRC about once a week (SOR ¶ 1.g); she has a friend who is a citizen and resident of the PRC, with whom she has contact about once a year (SOR ¶¶ 1.f and

1.h); and she traveled to the PRC in December 2000 and June 2005 to visit family members (SOR ¶ 1.i).

The security concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows:

Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

Four disqualifying conditions under this guideline are relevant to this case:

AG ¶ 7(a): contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;

AG ¶ 7(b): connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;

AG ¶ 7(d): sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and

AG ¶ 7(i): conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country.

AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (d) require substantial evidence of a "heightened risk." The "heightened risk" required to raise one of these disqualifying conditions is a relatively low standard. "Heightened risk" denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in having a family member living under a foreign government.

Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. "The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,

regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004).

Furthermore, “even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.” ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002). Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. Nevertheless, the nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S., and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the U.S. In light of the PRC’s repressive and authoritarian government and its track record of targeting the U.S. for sensitive information, Applicant has a very heavy burden of persuasion to overcome the security concerns arising from her ties to the PRC.

The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well as each individual family tie must be considered. ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Applicant’s parents live with her in the U.S., but they are citizens of the PRC and receive small pensions from the PRC. They recently returned temporarily to the PRC to take advantage of low-cost medical care. Her sister is a citizen and resident of the PRC who has been imprisoned for her religious views. Applicant’s father-in-law also is a citizen of the PRC, but he resides in the U.S. “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, the immediate family members of the person’s spouse.” ISCR Case No. 01-03120, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 94 at * 8 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002). Applicant has not rebutted that presumption with respect to her father-in-law. I conclude AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) are raised.

Applicant has rebutted the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.b that her spouse is a citizen of the PRC. He is now a U.S. citizen, his mother is deceased, his father is a U.S. resident, and his brother is a citizen and resident of Canada. She has also rebutted the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.e that her brother-in-law is a citizen of the PRC. Her brother-in-law and his spouse are citizens and residents of Canada. Based on this evidence, I conclude AG ¶ 7(d) is not raised.

Applicant admitted maintaining once-a-year social contact with a former neighbor and babysitter (alleged in SOR ¶ 1.h) until about three years ago, but she terminated that contact when she became aware that it might raise security concerns. I conclude she has rebutted the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.h.

Applicant’s travel to the PRC in December 2000 was solely to visit her family, who then resided in the PRC. This trip has no independent security significance. See ISCR Case No. 02-26978 (App. Bd. Sep 21, 2005). However, her travel to the PRC in June 2005 appears to have been for pleasure as well as to visit her family. It occurred

shortly after her PRC passport was cancelled and her U.S. passport was stamped with a PRC entry visa, and while she was employed by a U.S. government contractor. These circumstances made her vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion, thereby raising AG ¶ 7(i).

Since the government produced substantial evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(i), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).

Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely that individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.” AG ¶ 8(a). Applicant’s family history and the nature of the PRC government negate application of this mitigating condition. Her sister is a known dissident who has been imprisoned by the PRC for her views. Applicant’s parents continue to receive small pensions from the PRC government, and they have sought low-cost medical care in the PRC. I conclude AG ¶ 8(a) is not established.

Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” AG ¶ 8(b). Under the old adjudicative guidelines, a disqualifying condition based on foreign family members could not be mitigated unless an applicant could establish that the family members were not “in a position to be exploited.” Directive ¶ E2.A2.1.3.1. The Appeal Board consistently applied this mitigating condition narrowly, holding that an applicant should not be placed in a position where he or she is forced to make a choice between the interests of the family member and the interests of the U.S. See ISCR Case No. 03-17620 at 4 (App. Bd. Apr. 17, 2006); ISCR Case No. 03-24933 at 6 (App. Bd. Jul. 28, 2005); ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2005); ISCR Case No. 03-15205 at 3 (App. Bd. Jan. 21, 2005). Thus, an administrative judge was not permitted to apply a balancing test to assess the extent of the security risk. Under the new guidelines, however, the potentially conflicting loyalties may be weighed to determine if an applicant “can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”

Applicant and her family have firsthand experience with repression in the PRC. She and her husband left the PRC mainly because of their experiences in that repressive environment. All of her husband’s immediate family and all her immediate family, except her sister, have left the PRC. Applicant has worked for U.S. government

contractors for many years. She has established strong ties to the U.S. and feels no loyalty to the PRC government. Her husband is a U.S. citizen and is also employed by a U.S. government contractor. Applicant and her husband are financially secure, making the significance of her parents' small pensions minimal.

Applicant has a reputation for being strong in the face of adversity. Her sister has challenged the PRC government in the past, demonstrating that she, like Applicant, is not easily intimidated or influenced.

Applicant has not divulged the nature of her work to her family members. She has demonstrated that she is very security conscious. I am confident that she would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. Thus, I conclude AG ¶ 8(b) is established.

Security concerns under this guideline also may be mitigated by showing that "contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation." AG ¶ 8(c). There is a rebuttable presumption that contacts with an immediate family member in a foreign country are not casual. ISCR Case No. 00-0484 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2002). Applicant has not overcome this presumption. Although Applicant has had minimal direct contact with her sister, she has demonstrated her sense of obligation to her sister by sponsoring her application for admission to the U.S. I conclude AG ¶ 8(c) is not established.

Security concerns raised by foreign travel may be mitigated if it was "approved by the cognizant security authority." AG ¶ 8(c). Although Applicant's travel to the PRC in June 2005 raises security concerns, the evidence reflects that she properly reported her travel to her employer, and she stayed in a hotel instead of her parents' home to avoid the requirement to register with local police. There is no evidence of any attempts by the PRC to exploit her while she was in the PRC. I conclude she has mitigated the security concerns raised by this travel.

Whole Person Concept

Under the whole person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all the relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):

- (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
- (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
- (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct;
- (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
- (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary;
- (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes;
- (7) the motivation

for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline B in my whole person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment.

Applicant was soft-spoken and reserved at the hearing, but her testimony was very direct, sincere, candid, and credible. Although she does not have a clearance, she is very security conscious, as demonstrated by her decision to terminate contact with a former neighbor in the PRC, her decision to stay in a hotel instead of her parents' home when she visited the PRC in June 2005, and her compliance with her employer's reporting requirements for foreign travel. She has a reputation and a track record of confronting adversity rather than succumbing to it. She has spent much of her life in government service. She does not work in the private sector, where the pressure to trade information for market access in the PRC would be stronger.

After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign influence. Accordingly, I conclude she has carried her burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant her eligibility for access to classified information.

Formal Findings

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR:

Paragraph 1, Guideline B (Foreign Influence): FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a-1.i: For Applicant

Conclusion

In light of all of the circumstances, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

LeRoy F. Foreman
Administrative Judge