



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**



In the matter of:

SSN: -----

Applicant for Security Clearance

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ISCR Case No. 10-00360

Appearances

For Government: Tovah A. Minster, Esq., Department Counsel

For Applicant: *Pro se*

December 23, 2010

Decision

FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge:

This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations). Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Statement of the Case

Applicant submitted his security clearance application (SCA) on July 24, 2009. On August 3, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny his application, citing security concerns under Guideline F. DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006.

Applicant received the SOR on August 9, 2010; answered it on August 31, 2010; and requested a determination on the record without a hearing. DOHA received his

response on September 7, 2010. Department Counsel submitted the Government's written case on October 5, 2010. On October 6, 2010, a complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM) was sent to Applicant, who was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government's evidence. He received the FORM on October 13, 2010, and did not respond. The case was assigned to me on December 10, 2010.

Findings of Fact

In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all the allegations in the SOR. His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact.

Applicant is a 37-year-old employee of a defense contractor who has been working as an apprentice since January 2007. He served in the U.S. Air Force from June 1991 to May 1993 and received a general discharge. (Item 1 at 24.) He has never held a security clearance. (Item 1 at 42.)

Applicant married in October 2007. He has two children, ages 14 and 11, who reside with their mothers and for whom he pays a total of \$580 per month in child support. His wife is employed as a nurse. (Item 6 at 3.)

Applicant admitted the 15 debts alleged in the SOR, totaling about \$66,000, and his admissions are corroborated by his credit bureau reports. (Items 7, 8, and 9.) His largest debt is a deficiency of \$54,787 resulting from the repossession of a truck in 2005 (SOR ¶ 1.h.) The truck repossession occurred when it required major time-consuming repairs, and he could not afford to continue making the payments while it was being repaired. (Item 6 at 6.)

Eight of Applicant's debts are for less than \$500 (SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b, 1.d, 1.f, 1.g, 1.k, 1.l, and 1.n). Three are for less than \$200 (SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.k, and 1.l).

In September 2009, Applicant was interviewed by a security investigator and did not dispute any of the delinquent debts reflected on his credit bureau reports. In his response to DOHA interrogatories in May 2010, he stated that he had contacted his creditors and had negotiated settlements or payment agreements with some of them, but had not yet made any payments. He attributed his financial problems to periods of unemployment and underemployment. (Item 6.) His SCA reflects unemployment from March 2001 to January 2002 and full-time employment as a truck driver from January 2002 until he began his current apprenticeship in January 2007. (Item 1 at 16-22.)

In his response to the SOR, Applicant did not submit any evidence of payments, settlements, or payment plans. All his delinquent debts remain unresolved. He has not submitted any information about his current family income or expenses.

Policies

“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to “control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” *Id.* at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.

Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See *Egan*, 484 U.S. at 531. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See *v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.*, 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).

Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security

clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” *Egan*, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).

Analysis

Guideline F, Financial Considerations

The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18:

Failure or inability to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.

Applicant's financial history establishes two disqualifying conditions: AG ¶ 19(a) (“inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts”) and AG ¶ 19(c) (“a history of not meeting financial obligations”). Thus, the burden shifted to Applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).

Security concerns based on financial considerations may be mitigated if “the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” AG ¶ 20(a). This mitigating condition is not established because Applicant has multiple debts that are not yet resolved and did not occur under circumstances making them unlikely to recur.

Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing that “the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances.” AG ¶ 20(b). Both prongs, i.e., conditions beyond the person's control and responsible conduct, must be established.

Applicant's unemployment from March 2001 until January 2002, and the mechanical problems with his truck, on which he depended for employment, were conditions beyond his control. However, he has been continuously employed since 2002; and he has presented no evidence that any debts have been paid, settled, or compromised, even though several of the debts are for small amounts. I conclude that AG ¶ 20(b) is not established.

Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing that “the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control.” AG ¶ 20(c). This mitigating condition is not established because there is no evidence that Applicant has sought or obtained financial counseling.

Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing that “the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.” AG ¶ 20(d). Good faith means acting in a way that shows reasonableness, prudence, honesty, and adherence to duty or obligation. ISCR Case No. 99-0201, 1999 WL 1442346 at *4 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 1999). An applicant is not required, as a matter of law, to establish resolution of each and every debt alleged in the SOR. See ADP Case No. 06-18900 (App. Bd. Jun. 6, 2008). An applicant need only establish a plan to resolve financial problems and take significant actions to implement the plan. ISCR Case No. 07-06482 at 2-3 (App. Bd. May 21, 2008). There also is no requirement that an applicant make payments on all delinquent debts simultaneously, nor is there a requirement that the debts alleged in the SOR be paid first. *Id.* This mitigating condition is not established because Applicant has presented no evidence of payments or settlements and no evidence of a plan to resolve his financial problems.

Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue.” AG ¶ 20(e). This mitigating condition is not established because Applicant had not disputed any of the debts.

Whole-Person Concept

Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):

- (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful

consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis.

After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline F, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns based on financial considerations. Accordingly, I conclude he has not carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified information.

Formal Findings

I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR:

Paragraph 1, Guideline F (Financial Considerations): AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a-1.o:

Against Applicant

Conclusion

I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

LeRoy F. Foreman
Administrative Judge