



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**



In the matter of:)
)
) ISCR Case No. 11-01881
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance)

Appearances

For Government: Raashid S. Williams, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: *Pro se*

02/22/2012

Decision

MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge:

Applicant, a native of Venezuela, lived in the United States with her family from age 11 to age 17. She moved to the United States on her own at age 21 in April 2000. In June 2006, she became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Her immediate family members, including her parents, are resident citizens of Venezuela, a country with human rights problems under an avowedly anti-American government. Applicant’s ties to the United States are not so deep and longstanding to overcome the foreign influence concerns. Clearance denied.

Statement of the Case

On September 7, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing the security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence, which provided the basis for its preliminary decision to deny her a security clearance. DOHA took action under Executive Order 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review*

Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006.

Applicant answered the SOR allegations on September 14, 2011, and she requested a decision without a hearing. On November 1, 2011, the Government submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM) consisting of five exhibits (Items 1-5), and a request for administrative notice dated October 27, 2011. DOHA forwarded a copy of the FORM to Applicant and instructed her to respond within 30 days of receipt. Applicant elected not to respond to the FORM or Administrative Notice request by the December 31, 2011 due-date. On January 19, 2012, the case was assigned to me to consider whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.

Procedural Rulings

In its FORM, the Government requested that the Administrative Judge take administrative notice of facts regarding the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Venezuela), as set forth in an attached Administrative Notice request. Due to administrative oversight, the request for Administrative Notice was omitted from the file forwarded to me for review. On February 15, 2012, in response to my request for clarification about whether the Government had submitted a request for Administrative Notice, Department Counsel forwarded an unsigned copy of the request dated October 27, 2011. Copies of the source documents (four publications from the U.S. State Department, a Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, and a congressional resolution of May 4, 2011) were not provided to me, although they were available on request. Applicant was provided the Administrative Notice request along with the six source documents, identified as I through VI in the Administrative Notice request.

In the absence of any objections from Applicant, and whereas the DOHA Appeal Board has repeatedly emphasized the importance of making accurate and timely assessments of the political landscape in foreign countries when adjudicating Guideline B cases (See e.g., ISCR Case No. 05-11292 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007)), I took Administrative Notice as requested by the Government. After reviewing the source documents, which were available on the internet, I took Administrative Notice of several facts pertinent to Venezuela and its international relations, including with the United States, as set forth below.

Findings of Fact

The SOR alleged under Guideline B that Applicant's parents (SOR 1.a and 1.b), two brothers (SOR 1.c), an aunt (SOR 1.d), and a cousin (SOR 1.e) are resident citizens of Venezuela. Applicant admitted the allegations, but added that she has been living in the United States permanently since age 21. Applicant's admissions are incorporated as findings of fact. After considering the Government's FORM, which includes Applicant's Answer (Item 3) and the Administrative Notice documents, I make the following additional findings of fact.

Applicant was born in Venezuela in 1979. Her father, a Colombian native, worked as an economist in Venezuela after being educated at a Venezuelan university. Applicant's mother was engaged in the practice of dentistry in her native Venezuela. Applicant's parents already had a son, who was born in 1975 in Venezuela. Applicant's father also had a son by another woman in Venezuela in 1972. Applicant's half-brother was not raised with Applicant and her brother. When Applicant was a toddler, her grandmother died. Applicant's mother had a younger sister, then 12 years old, who came to live in their home. Applicant looked on her aunt as an older sister, and they developed a close relationship over the years. (Items 4, 5.)

During the mid-1980s, Applicant's father taught economics at the Venezuelan university he had attended. Her mother was a professor at the same university. (Item 5.) Between the ages of 11 and 17, Applicant lived in the United States with her family. Her parents came to the United States for business reasons that are not apparent in the record. Around 1996, the family returned to Venezuela. (Item 3.) Her father began working as an economic adviser to an official of the Venezuelan government. (Item 5.)

After graduating from high school, Applicant worked as an international flight attendant for a Venezuelan airline from August 1998 to April 2000. In April 2000, Applicant came to the United States with the intent of pursuing her career here. She entered the United States on a Venezuelan passport issued in March 1999. In October 2000, Applicant began working as a part-time bartender at a new hotel. In December 2000, she married a Cuban native, who was a U.S. citizen. In December 2001, Applicant left her job at the hotel. In January 2002, she matriculated in a local community college toward her associate's degree. She worked part-time as a cocktail server from February 2002 to December 2002 while in school. (Items 4, 5.)

In March 2001, Applicant began working part-time as a receptionist for her mother-in-law's home health care agency while continuing to pursue her education. After one year, she became an administrative assistant for the business. (Item 4.) Applicant earned her Associate in Arts degree in December 2003, and from January 2004 to May 2006, she pursued her bachelor's degree. On June 14, 2006, Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen, and she acquired her U.S. passport one week later. (Item 4.)

Applicant relocated to attend law school starting in August 2006. In September 2006, Applicant bought a townhouse in her new area with her parents' financial help and a mortgage of \$212,000. Applicant quit law school after one year, and she and her spouse moved into an apartment owned by her father-in-law in her previous locale. (Items 4, 5.) Applicant worked for her mother-in-law's company as its human resources director.¹ (Item 4.)

¹Applicant's now ex-spouse was apparently working for his mother as well. Around the time that they separated in April 2009, Applicant indicates that "the company was not doing as well as before and both of our paychecks were reduced; making it even harder for both of us to continue paying for the mortgage when we both were beginning to pay for our separate rents and expenses." (Item 5.)

Applicant rented out her townhouse to a couple who had trouble paying the rent after the male partner was laid off. She lowered the rent after her tenants vacated, but she had no success in finding new renters. Applicant and her spouse managed to cover the mortgage payment on her townhouse until they separated. Around April 2009, Applicant moved into a studio apartment, and she could not afford to cover the mortgage as well as support herself on her own. She put the townhome on the market and eventually resolved the delinquent mortgage through a short sale in May 2010. Despite her divorce, which was granted in December 2009, Applicant remained on good terms with her former mother-in-law, who helped her resolve some credit card debts incurred during her marriage. (Item 5.)

In late June 2010, Applicant moved to her present locale in the hope of finding her “dream job.” She engaged in part-time telework as a home health consultant for her former mother-in-law’s business while she sought permanent employment. On September 22, 2010, Applicant completed an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) for a defense contractor seeking her services as a Spanish linguist if she obtained a security clearance. Applicant disclosed the Venezuelan citizenship and residency of her parents, brother, half-brother, aunt, and a male cousin (her aunt’s only child). Applicant reported contact three to seven times a year with her aunt and cousin, and two visits from her aunt in the United States. Applicant added, “And of course when I travel to Venezuela I see [my aunt and cousin] all the time.” Applicant indicated that she had taken many short trips of around ten days each to Venezuela to see her parents and other relatives since June 2001. Applicant also disclosed foreign travel to Cuba in March 2010, and previous travel to other countries in the Caribbean for tourism. (Item 4.)

Around April 2011, Applicant provided DOHA with details about her relatives and their occupations in Venezuela. Between 2001 and 2004, her father served as director and later as vice minister of a department of the Venezuelan government related to food. At other times during his career, he provided independent consulting services to some Venezuelan government agencies. Applicant’s mother worked as a dentist as a direct employee of the Venezuelan government during the early 2000s. To her knowledge, none of Applicant’s other Venezuelan relatives ever worked for the Venezuelan government. Most of her contact is with her parents, who have visited her in the United States. She emails her brother “once in a while.” He still lives with their parents, and Applicant discusses music with him when she calls home. Applicant and her brother call or send email messages whenever they want to correspond, which can vary from months with no contact to more frequent contact. As for her half-brother, Applicant occasionally sees him when she is in Venezuela. Applicant disclosed close relations to her aunt, who is like a sister to her, and her aunt’s son, who she is like a brother to her. They email each other monthly and converse by telephone at least quarterly. Extended family members living in Venezuela include cousins, with whom she may correspond by email once or twice a year. On family vacations in Venezuela, Applicant has gotten together “for a day or two” with some of the closer extended family members.

In response to DOHA’s inquiries about her Venezuela passport, Applicant indicated that her Venezuela passport issued in March 1999 was valid for five years. At her request, on May 7, 2004, the Venezuelan consulate extended the passport to March 1, 2009. She

explained that she was required to use her Venezuelan passport after she became a U.S. citizen to enter Venezuela. She entered Venezuela on her Venezuelan passport to see her parents in May 2007, August 2007, and March 2008. Her Venezuelan passport apparently also bears a stamp showing her entry into the country on December 29, 2009, even though her foreign passport had expired. Applicant intended to renew her Venezuelan passport during that trip, but she did not have time to do so because of the holidays. She left the expired passport in her parents' custody when she returned to the United States. (Item 5.)

Applicant has no foreign financial assets. As of late March 2011, she earned a gross salary of \$3,600 per month for her telework as a home health consultant. Applicant had some part-time work for an association in her area, which paid her \$13 an hour. The extra \$910 in net salary gave her sufficient income to cover her monthly expenses, which included her rent at \$1,392, \$606 in car expenses, and \$310 in student loan payments. Applicant estimated her U.S. net worth at \$33,300, \$25,000 being the value of her vehicle. (Item 5.)

Administrative Notice

After considering official U.S. government publications and statements about Venezuela and its foreign relations, including with the United States, I took administrative notice of the following pertinent facts:

Venezuela is a constitutional democracy led by a president, Hugo Chavez Frias, who has undermined democracy and orchestrated the government takeover of several important sectors of the Venezuelan economy in recent years, including assets owned by U.S. companies in the country. In January 2007, Chavez was granted special constitutional power to nationalize by decree the telecommunications and electricity sectors. Proposed reforms to the country's 1999 constitution, including measures that would have allowed indefinite presidential re-election, reorganization of the geographic boundaries of government, and redefinition of private property, were narrowly defeated in a public referendum in December 2007, only to be subsequently enacted through presidential decree or legislation. In 2009, the Venezuelan government nationalized assets in the oil, chemicals, tourism, agribusiness, retail, and banking industries. In 2010, companies in the agricultural and construction sectors were taken over by the Venezuelan government.

Strong economic ties persist between the United States and Venezuela. The United States is Venezuela's most important trading partner, with U.S. goods accounting for 25% of imports and approximately 50% of Venezuelan exports going to the United States. Venezuela is one of the top four suppliers of foreign oil to the United States, and a significant U.S. corporate presence remains in Venezuela. However, political relations between the two countries have been strained in recent years. President Chavez is committed to promoting his "Bolivarian Revolution" as a model for other countries to follow, and to establishing a Latin America policy paradigm devoid of U.S. influence. He regularly uses incendiary rhetoric to insult the U.S. government and maintains very close relations with the Castro regime in Cuba. Since 2005, President Chavez has deepened relations with Iran, a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism, by signing multiple economic and

social accords and publicly supporting Iran's controversial nuclear program. The Chavez government has also reached out to North Korea, Belarus, and Syria (also a state sponsor of terrorism) as well as strengthened its economic, political, and military ties to Russia, and China. Since 2005, the Venezuelan government has purchased over \$4 billion in arms from Russia and some K-8 jet trainers from China. In September 2008, the U.S. ambassador was expelled from Venezuela by Chavez acting in solidarity with the Bolivian government's decision to expel the U.S. ambassador from La Paz. Following a reciprocal expulsion of the Venezuelan ambassador from Washington, the U.S. and Venezuela agreed in April 2009 to seek a relationship based on mutual interest. Their respective ambassadors were returned to their posts in the summer of 2009. Yet, in May 2010, the U.S. State Department determined that Venezuela was not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, and the U.S. renewed an arms embargo against Venezuela for all U.S. commercial arms sales and re-transfers to Venezuela. In November 2010, during a visit to Iran, President Chavez condemned international sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. In December 2010, Venezuela revoked the agreement for the U.S. ambassador-designate. Seven days later, the U.S. revoked the diplomatic visa of the Venezuelan ambassador. On May 4, 2011, the 112th Congress proposed House Resolution 247 calling for the designation of Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism for its support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).²

The United States and human rights organizations have expressed concerns for several years about the deterioration of democratic institutions and threats to freedom of speech and press in Venezuela under the Chavez government. As reported by the U.S. State Department, human rights abuses in Venezuela in 2010 included unlawful killings; summary executions of criminal suspects; widespread kidnapping for ransom; arbitrary arrest and detention; rampant corruption; attempted extortion by airport officials from travelers; inefficiency and politicization in a judicial system characterized by violations of due process; selective prosecution and retribution for political purposes; infringement of citizens' personal privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of expression; and harassment of independent media. The Venezuelan government reportedly engaged in reprisals against prominent Venezuelan citizens, including a former ambassador to the United Nations, a Roman Catholic cardinal, a retired brigadier general, and the president of the national chamber of commerce, for their public criticisms of the president or government policy.

Policies

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security, emphasizing that "no one has a 'right' to a security clearance." *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant's suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief

²According to the U.S. State Department's *Country Reports on Terrorism 2010* concerning Venezuela, the Venezuelan government took no action against government and military officials linked to the FARC or the National Liberation Army (ELN). A Venezuelan general, who had been designated by the United States in September 2008 for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of the FARC, remained director of a Venezuelan military intelligence directorate.

introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are required to be considered in evaluating an applicant's eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge's overall adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the "whole-person concept." The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that "[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security." In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting "witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . ." The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.

A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." See *also* EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

Analysis

Guideline B—Foreign Influence

The security concerns about foreign influence are set out in AG ¶ 6:

Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the

foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

The security concerns underlying AG ¶ 7(a), “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion,” are established. Applicant has ongoing contacts with her parents, brother, aunt, and her aunt’s son, who are resident citizens of Venezuela. Venezuela’s economy remains dependent on U.S. trade, and significant U.S. corporate presence remains in Venezuela despite the Chavez government’s nationalization of several industries. Nonetheless, Venezuela’s relationship with the United States has deteriorated significantly, due in part to the Venezuelan government pursuing close relations with U.S. adversaries, enabling drug trafficking, and failing to cooperate in the U.S.-led regional fight against terror. The Chavez government, long a friend of the Castro regime in Cuba, has deepened its relations with Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism. In May 2011, members of the 112th Congress proposed a resolution to have Venezuela designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for its support to Iran, Hezbollah, and the FARC.

AG ¶ 7(b), “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information,” focuses not on contacts, but rather on relationships with foreign persons, organizations, governments, or countries that pose a risk of a conflict of interest. While there is a significant degree of overlap between AG ¶ 7(a) and ¶ 7(b), the concern under AG ¶ 7(b) is that Applicant has such close bonds to Venezuelan citizens that she could be placed in the position of having to choose between their interests and her obligation to protect classified information. Applicant does not deny her affection for her parents. She talks to her brother when she calls home to Venezuela. Applicant’s contact with her aunt and aunt’s son averages three to seven times per year. They are like an older sister and a brother to her, and she sees them when she is in Venezuela. AG ¶ 7(b) also applies.

AG ¶ 7(i), “conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country,” is implicated in that Applicant used her Venezuelan passport while she was a U.S. citizen to enter Venezuela. Apparently, she presented a valid Venezuelan passport to enter Venezuela in May 2007, August 2007, and March 2008, and her by-then-expired Venezuelan passport to enter the country in late December 2009. She admits that she was required to use her Venezuelan passport because of her birth there, and that she intended to renew her foreign passport during her latest trip, although she did not have time because of the holidays. Her conduct was not alleged as an act of foreign preference, and she did not indicate on her e-QIP that she holds dual citizenship with Venezuela. However, by presenting herself as a Venezuelan citizen at the border, she demonstrated willingness to comply with the laws applicable to those persons born in Venezuela.³ That being said, there is no evidence that she was pressured or brought any

³In its *Venezuela Country Specific Information*, dated July 8, 2011, the U.S. State Department reports that in

undue attention to herself during any of her trips to Venezuela. The primary security concern is because of her close family relations in Venezuela.

The closeness of the family ties; her parents' occupational endeavors in Venezuela, which include past government employment in positions of some prominence; and the concerns about Venezuela because of its human rights abuses, its avowedly anti-American government, and its support for terrorist states or groups such as Iran, Hezbollah, and the FARC; make it very difficult to apply mitigating condition AG ¶ 8(a):

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely that the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.

Applicant's father is an economist who was on the faculty of a Venezuelan university in the mid-1980s. More recently, he served as director and later as vice-minister of a department of the Venezuelan government. At other times during his career, he has provided independent consulting services to some Venezuelan government agencies. Applicant's mother is a dentist, who was employed directly by the Venezuelan government. It is unclear whether either parent has any current ties to the Chavez administration or any duties with military, security, or intelligence implications. However, the risk of undue foreign influence persists because of their professional status and previous employments in academia and with the federal government in Venezuela.

As a U.S. immigrant, Applicant may reasonably be expected to have some contact with, and feelings of affection or obligation, for her immediate family in Venezuela. Yet, Applicant's relationships and loyalties to her parents, brother, aunt, and cousin, cannot reasonably be characterized as minimal. The foreign influence concerns may be overcome by evidence of "deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S." AG ¶ 8(b) provides as follows:

(b) there is no conflict of interest either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.

Applicant has lived continuously in the United States since April 2000. She married a naturalized U.S. citizen (Cuban native) in December 2000. Despite her divorce in December 2009, Applicant continues to have a close personal and professional relationship with her former mother-in-law. Applicant has worked for her mother-in-law's health care agency on a part-time basis since March 2001. Applicant earned her bachelor's

order to comply with U.S. and Venezuelan law, persons who hold dual U.S.-Venezuelan nationality must plan to travel between Venezuela and the United States with valid U.S. and Venezuelan passports.

degree in the United States, and in 2006, she voluntarily acquired her U.S. citizenship. She has no financial ties to Venezuela, although her financial net worth in the U.S. is only around \$33,300, \$25,000 being the value of her vehicle. I cannot conclude with confidence that Applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest, however. Applicant travels to Venezuela to see her immediate family members “whenever [she has] the possibilities [sic].” (Item 4.) Applicant’s use of her foreign passport to enter Venezuela on four separate occasions, while she was a U.S. citizen and held a U.S. passport, may have been required under Venezuelan law, but it undermines her case for mitigation under AG ¶ 8(b).

AG ¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation,” has limited applicability in this case to her half-brother. He was not raised with Applicant and her brother, and she sees him only occasionally when she is in Venezuela.

Whole-Person Concept

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must consider the totality of an applicant’s conduct and all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors in AG ¶ 2(a).⁴

Applicant left her native Venezuela when she was 21 to pursue her professional goals in the United States. She maintains close ties to her immediate family members in Venezuela, including an aunt and cousin, who are like siblings to her. Applicant’s parents supported her decision to immigrate, and they helped her financially when she purchased a townhouse in 2006. They have visited her in the United States. Applicant has traveled to Venezuela to visit them four times since May 2007. While she has a close personal and business relationship with her former mother-in-law in the U.S., it is not enough to overcome the foreign influence concerns that exist because of her close ties of affection or obligation to her immediate family members in Venezuela. For the reasons stated above, I am unable to conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance at this time.

Formal Findings

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

⁴ The factors under AG ¶ 2(a) are as follows:

- (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraph 1.a-1.e: Against Applicant

Conclusion

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Elizabeth M. Matchinski
Administrative Judge