

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS



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)	ISCR Case No. 15-03399
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Appearances	5
rid F. Hayes, Es or Applicant: <i>Pr</i>	sq., Department Counsel o se
06/05/2017	,
Decision	
	id F. Hayes, Es or Applicant: <i>Pr</i> 06/05/2017

KATAUSKAS, Philip J., Administrative Judge:

Applicant contests the Defense Department's intent to revoke his eligibility for access to classified information. He did not present sufficient evidence to explain, extenuate, or mitigate the security concern stemming from his problematic financial history. Accordingly, this case is decided against Applicant.

#### Statement of the Case

Applicant completed and submitted a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF 86 format) on February 13, 2013. This document is commonly known as a security clearance application. On February 17, 2016, after reviewing the application and the information gathered during a background investigation, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility sent Applicant a statement of reasons (SOR), explaining it was unable to find that it was clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified information. The SOR is similar to a complaint

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This action was taken under Executive Order (E.O.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended, as well as Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive). In

in a civil court case. It detailed the factual reasons for the action under the security guideline known as Guideline F for financial considerations. Applicant answered the SOR on March 15, 2016, and requested a decision based on the written record without a hearing.

On May 31, 2016, Department Counsel submitted a file of relevant material (FORM).<sup>2</sup> The FORM was mailed to Applicant on that same day. He was given an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government's evidence. Applicant received the FORM on June 22, 2016.<sup>3</sup> Applicant did not respond to the FORM. The case was assigned to me on May 4, 2017.

## **Procedural Matters**

Included in the FORM were six items of evidence, which are marked as Government Exhibits 1 through 5.4 Exhibits 1, and 3 through 5 are admitted into evidence. Exhibit 2 is a report of investigation (ROI) summarizing Applicant's interview that took place during the April 2013 background investigation. The ROI is not authenticated, as required under ¶ E3.1.20 of the Directive.<sup>5</sup> Department Counsel's written brief includes a footnote advising Applicant that the summary was not authenticated and that failure to object may constitute a waiver of the authentication requirement. Nevertheless, I am not persuaded that a *pro* se applicant's failure to respond to the FORM, which response is optional, equates to a knowing and voluntary waiver of the authentication requirement. The record does not demonstrate that Applicant understood the concepts of authentication, waiver, and admissibility. It also does not demonstrate that he understood the implications of waiving an objection to the admissibility of the ROI. Accordingly, Exhibit 2 is inadmissible, and I have not considered the information in the ROI.

addition, the *Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information* (AG), effective within the Defense Department on September 1, 2006, apply here. The AG were published in the Federal Register and codified in 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The file of relevant material consists of Department Counsel's written brief and supporting documentation, some of which are identified as evidentiary exhibits in this decision.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals' (DOHA) transmittal letter is dated June 8, 2016, and Applicant's receipt is dated June 22, 2016. The DOHA transmittal letter informed Applicant that he had 30 days after receiving it to submit information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The first item in the FORM is the SOR and Applicant's Answer. Because the SOR and the Answer are the pleadings in this case, they are not marked as Exhibits. Items 2 through 6 are marked as Exhibits 1 through 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See generally ISCR Case No. 12-10933 (App. Bd. Jun. 29, 2016) (In a concurring opinion, Judge Ra'anan notes the historical concern about reports of investigation in that they were considered by some to present a heightened problem in providing due process in security clearance cases. Judge Ra'anan raises a number of pertinent questions about using an unauthenticated ROI in a non-hearing case with a *pro se* applicant.).

# **Findings of Fact**

Applicant is 53 years old and a high school graduate. He is married and has one adult daughter. Since October of 1983, he has been employed by a defense contractor.<sup>6</sup>

The SOR alleged a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy petition filed in June 2010 and dismissed in 2011, and 13 delinquent debts totaling \$30,224.7 Applicant admitted the bankruptcy allegation and six of the delinquent debts totaling \$22,348.8 He denied seven of the delinquent debts totaling \$7,876.9 Applicant did not provide any documentation to support his denials. Except for one denied SOR debt,<sup>10</sup> there is record evidence to support the debts that Applicant denied.<sup>11</sup>

#### Law and Policies

It is well-established law that no one has a right to a security clearance. <sup>12</sup> As noted by the Supreme Court in *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, "the clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials." <sup>13</sup> Under *Egan*, Executive Order 10865, and the Directive, any doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to classified information will be resolved in favor of protecting national security.

A favorable clearance decision establishes eligibility of an applicant to be granted a security clearance for access to confidential, secret, or top-secret information.<sup>14</sup> An unfavorable clearance decision (1) denies any application, (2) revokes any existing security clearance, and (3) prevents access to classified information at any level.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Exhibit 1.
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.n.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1c.and 1.f-1i.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> SOR ¶¶ 1.d-e and 1.j-1n.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> I could not find any evidence supporting SOR ¶ 1.m.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Exhibit 4, pp. 7, 17; Exhibit 5, pp. 2, 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988) ("it should be obvious that no one has a 'right' to a security clearance"); Duane v. Department of Defense, 275 F.3d 988, 994 (10<sup>TH</sup> Cir. 2002) (no right to a security clearance).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> 484 U.S. at 531.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Directive, ¶ 3.2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Directive, ¶ 3.2.

There is no presumption in favor of granting, renewing, or continuing eligibility for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of presenting evidence to establish facts alleged in the SOR that have been controverted. An applicant is responsible for presenting evidence to refute, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts that have been admitted or proven. In addition, an applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance decision.

In *Egan*, the Supreme Court stated that the burden of proof is less than a preponderance of evidence.<sup>20</sup> The Appeal Board has followed the Court's reasoning, and a judge's findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard.<sup>21</sup>

## **Discussion**

Under Guideline F for financial considerations,<sup>22</sup> the suitability of an applicant may be questioned or put into doubt when that applicant has a history of excessive indebtedness or financial problems or difficulties. The overall concern is:

Failure or inability to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about a [person's] reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information.<sup>23</sup>

The concern is broader than the possibility that a person might knowingly compromise classified information to obtain money or something else of value. It encompasses concerns about a person's self-control, judgment, and other important qualities. A person who is financially irresponsible may also be irresponsible, unconcerned, or negligent in handling and safeguarding classified information.

In analyzing the facts of this case, I considered the following disqualifying and mitigating conditions or factors:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> ISCR Case No. 02-18663 (App. Bd. Mar. 23, 2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> ISCR Case No. 01-20700 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002) (citations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> AG ¶¶ 18, 19, and 20 (setting forth the concern and the disqualifying and mitigating conditions).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> AG ¶ 18.

AG ¶ 19(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;

AG ¶ 19(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations;

AG ¶ 20(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problems were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce, or separation), and the [person] acted responsibly under the circumstances;

AG ¶ 20(c) [t]here are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control: and

AG ¶ 20(d) the [person] initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.

The evidence supports a conclusion that Applicant has a problematic financial history sufficient to raise a security concern under AG ¶¶ 19(a) and (c). Applicant has produced no documentation to support his answers to the SOR debts. In fact, the evidence is contrary to his answers. The Appeal Board has repeatedly held that applicants must present documentation to support their claims that debts have been resolved.<sup>24</sup> I conclude that none of the Guideline F mitigating conditions apply.

The record creates doubt about Applicant's reliability, trustworthiness, good judgment, and ability to protect classified information. In reaching this conclusion, I weighed the evidence as a whole and considered if the favorable evidence outweighed the unfavorable evidence or *vice versa*. I also gave due consideration to the whole-person concept.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, I conclude that Applicant did not meet his ultimate burden of persuasion to show that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified information.

# **Formal Findings**

As required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, I make the following formal findings on the SOR allegations:

Paragraph 1, Guideline F: Against Applicant

Subparagraphs 1.a-1.l & n: Against Applicant

Subparagraph 1.m: For Applicant

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 07-10310 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 30, 2008) (it is reasonable for a judge to expect an applicant to present documentation about the satisfaction or other resolution of individual debts); ISCR Case No. 06-17520 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 20, 2007).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> AG ¶ 2(a)(1)-(9).

# Conclusion

In light of the record as a whole, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant access to classified information.

Philip J. Katauskas Administrative Judge