

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS



In the matter of:	)	ISCR Case No. 16-02914
Applicant for Security Clearance	)	13CK Case No. 10-02914
	Appearanc	es
	J. Kilmartin Applicant:	, Esq., Department Counsel <i>Pro se</i>
_	10/24/201	7
	Decision	1

CERVI, Gregg A., Administrative Judge

This case involves security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations). Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

### **Statement of the Case**

Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on May 13, 2015. On October 25, 2016, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) sent her a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline F.¹ Applicant answered the SOR on November 21, 2016, and elected to have the case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. The Government's written brief with supporting documents, known as the File of Relevant Material (FORM), was submitted by Department Counsel on December 22, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The DOD CAF acted under Executive Order (Exec. Or.) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on September 1, 2006.

A complete copy of the FORM was provided to Applicant, who was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns. Applicant received the FORM on January 11, 2017. She submitted a response to the FORM, marked as Applicant Exhibit (AE) A. The Government's exhibits included in the FORM (Items 1 to 5) and AE A are admitted into evidence. The case was assigned to me on October 1, 2017.

## **Findings of Fact**

Applicant is a 39-year-old environmental coordinator employed by a defense contractor since 2013. She received her high school diploma in 1996 with vocational training in computer technology. She has been married since 1999 and has two children, 10 and 11 years old. She has held a DOD security clearance since 2007.

The SOR alleges Applicant is delinquent on three small medical debts and an auto loan judgment. She admitted the SOR allegations. Applicant was unaware of the SOR debts until her clearance reinvestigation. She paid the small medical debts in 2016 and January of 2017, and provided evidence of the payments. The auto loan judgment in 2009 stems from a repossession in approximately 2009. She was a data entry clerk at the time, and did not have sufficient income to cover her auto loan payments when due. Applicant believed that she received a loan payoff notice when the car was repossessed and sold, and there have been no efforts to collect on the debt. Her 2015 credit bureau report (CBR) shows the debt was charged-off in 2009, but also an unverified judgment. Her 2016 CBR no longer shows a judgment on this loan, and no longer reports the original creditor and charge-off.

Applicant notes that she has taken responsibility for not making payments on-time, but she was unable to keep up with the payments with her income. She expressed her pride and degree of responsibility in her work, and provided work evaluations showing she has been a good performer during the past two years. Her personal financial statement shows she is now able to meet her financial obligations and has almost \$3,000 net remainder per month after paying expenses.

### Law and Policies

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) in a Security Executive Agent Directive, effective on June 8, 2017. These AGs are applicable to this decision.

"[N]o one has a 'right' to a security clearance." Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to "control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information." Id. at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information "only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so." Exec. Or. 10865 § 2.

National security eligibility is predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge's overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An administrative judge must consider a person's stability, trustworthiness, reliability, discretion, character, honesty, and judgment. AG ¶ 1(b).

The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Clearance decisions must be made "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.

Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. "Substantial evidence" is "more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant's security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at \*3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).

Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).

An applicant "has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance." ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). "[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials." Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG  $\P$  1(d).

## Analysis

#### **Financial Considerations**

The security concern for financial considerations is set out in AG ¶ 18:

Failure to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Financial distress can also be caused or exacerbated by, and thus can be a possible indicator of, other issues of personnel security concern such as excessive gambling, mental health conditions, substance misuse, or alcohol abuse or dependence. An individual who is financially overextended is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 19. The relevant disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 19 include:

- (a) inability to satisfy debts; and
- (c) a history of not meeting financial obligations.

Applicant's admissions and the documentary evidence supporting the SOR allegations are sufficient to establish the disqualifying conditions.

Conditions that could mitigate the financial considerations security concerns are provided under AG ¶ 20. The following mitigating conditions are potentially relevant:

- (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
- (b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; and
- (d) the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts; and

Applicant was unaware of the SOR debts until her reinvestigation raised the concerns. She investigated and paid the medical debts in 2016 and January 2017, and believes her 2009 vehicle repossession was resolved. Her current CBR does not reflect

a judgment or charged-off debt, likely because of the age of the debt. There have been no collection efforts, and Applicant believes the debt was discharged when the vehicle was sold.

Appellant's financial condition that led to the SOR debts was largely outside of her control as she had insufficient income to meet her financial obligations at the time. She took action to resolve the medical debts and believes the judgment or charged-off car loan is resolved. Applicant's current budget shows that she is on sound financial footing, and that she can meet all of her financial needs. She has not incurred any significant financial delinquencies since 2009 and sufficient time has passed to suggest that it is unlikely to recur. AG ¶¶ 20 (a), (b), and (d) apply.

Applicant's resolved debts and showing of current financial responsibility leave me without doubts about her overall financial condition and ability or willingness to face her financial responsibilities. They no longer cast doubt on her current reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment.

# **Whole-Person Concept**

Under AG ¶¶ 2(a), 2(c), and 2(d), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security eligibility must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG  $\P$  2(d). Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable eligibility determination, the individual may be found ineligible if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or unstable behavior. AG  $\P$  2(e).

I considered all of the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my findings of fact and comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis. Applicant has taken sufficient action to resolve her financial delinquencies, and is currently financially sound.

Accordingly, I conclude she has carried her burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant her eligibility for access to classified information.

# **Formal Findings**

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline F: For Applicant

Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.d: For Applicant

## Conclusion

I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States to grant Applicant eligibility for access to classified information. Clearance is granted.

Gregg A. Cervi Administrative Judge