

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS



In the matter of:)	
Applicant for Security Clearance)))	ISCR Case No. 17-02299
	Appearanc	ces
•	De Angelis Applicant:	s, Esq., Department Counsel <i>Pro</i> se
A	ugust 16, 2	2018
	Decision	

CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge:

Statement of the Case

On August 23, 2017, in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6, as amended (Directive), the Department of Defense issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guideline F. The SOR further informed Applicant that, based on information available to the government, DoD adjudicators could not make the preliminary affirmative finding it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant's security clearance.

Applicant answered the SOR on September 8, 2017, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. (Answer.) The case was assigned to me on October 23, 2017. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on October 24, 2017, scheduling the hearing for November 20, 2017. The hearing was convened as scheduled. The Government offered Exhibits (GXs) 1 through 4, which were admitted into evidence. Applicant testified on his own behalf and presented seven documents, which I marked Applicant's Exhibits (AppXs) A through G, and admitted into evidence. The record was left open until January 19, 2018, for receipt of additional

documentation. On January 19, 2018 Applicant offered AppXs H and I, which were admitted into evidence. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (TR) on November 29, 2017.

Findings of Fact

Applicant admitted to the allegation of the SOR. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact.

Applicant is a 33-year-old employee of a defense contractor. (GX 1 at pages 5 and 9.) He has been employed with the defense contractor since August of 2014.

Guideline F – Financial Considerations

1.a. Applicant admits that he owed about \$24,258 in outstanding student loans. He attending college "from 2003 to 2007." (TR at page 19 lines 6~11.) He left college without graduating, and entered the real-estate business and other endeavors. (*Id.*, and TR at page 21 line 2 to page 23 line 12.) Until his current employment, however, Applicant was either unemployed or underemployed, which affected his ability to pay his student loans. (*Id.*)

In August of 2014, Applicant began making monthly payment of \$125, through a fiscal intermediary (FI), towards his student loans, as evidenced by banking records. (TR at page 23 line 18 to page 39 line 6, and AppX D.) This FI turned out to be a fraud as evidenced by court records. (TR at page 23 line 18 to page 39 line 6, and AppXs B and C.) Applicant has since hired a new FI; and as a result, his student loan debt "has been settled in full," as evidenced by documentation from said FI. (AppX H.) This allegation is found for Applicant.

Policies

When evaluating an applicant's national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant's national security eligibility.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in conjunction with the factors listed in AG \P 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge's overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG \P 2(a), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG \P 2(b) requires that "[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of national security." In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record.

Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Directive ¶ E3.1.15 states the "applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision."

A person who applies for access to classified information seeks to enter into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.

Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).

Analysis

Guideline F - Financial Considerations

The security concern relating to the guideline for Financial Considerations is set out in AG ¶ 18:

Failure to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Financial distress can also be caused or exacerbated by, and thus can be a possible indicator of, other issues of personnel security concern such as excessive gambling, mental health conditions, substance misuse, or alcohol abuse or dependence. An individual who is financially overextended is at greater risk of having to engage in illegal or otherwise questionable acts to generate funds. Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is also a security concern insofar as it may result from criminal activity, including espionage.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 19. Three are potentially applicable in this case:

- (a) inability to satisfy debts;
- (b) unwillingness to satisfy debts regardless of the ability to do so; and
- (c) a history of not meeting financial obligations.

Applicant had significant outstanding student loans. The evidence is sufficient to raise these disqualifying conditions.

- AG \P 20 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG \P 20 including:
 - (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
 - (b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation, clear victimization by predatory lending practices, or identity theft), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; and
 - (d) the individual initiated and is adhering to a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.

Applicant's financial problems have been addressed. He suffered through a period of unemployment and underemployment, and was also the victim of fraud. He has now settled his student loan debt, and has demonstrated that future financial problems are unlikely. Mitigation under AG \P 20 has been established.

Whole-Person Concept

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG \P 2(d):

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation

for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guideline F in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG \P 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant is well respected in the workplace, as evidenced by letters from past and present employers. (AppXs F and G.)

Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to Applicant's eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated the Financial Considerations security concerns.

Formal Findings

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT

Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant

Conclusion

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant national security eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.

Richard A. Cefola Administrative Judge